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Justice Breyer began his classic article, The Uneasy Case for Cop-
yright,1 with a line from Lord Macaulay, that copyright is “‘a tax on
readers for the purpose of giving a bounty to writers.’”2  Our society
and its law values both writers and readers; the law cannot favor one
side too much without losing some of the benefits the other side could
have contributed.  Make reading expensive and it will decrease, and
readers might substitute less socially productive behaviors to take its
place.3
In the years since Macaulay, our perception of what is at stake on
the “reader” side has drastically expanded.  We know that “readers”
are often themselves creative people, creating follow-on works of so-
cial import, from fan fiction to compatible software to mashups to
works of serious cultural demeanor.  We also know that apparently
noncreative replication can be an expressive and important act,4 as we
see when we witness schoolchildren iteratively repeating the Pledge of
Allegiance or religious groups repeating age-old prayers.  A contem-
porary audience thus interprets Macaulay’s references to go well be-
yond the literal act of reading.
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1 Stephen Breyer, The Uneasy Case for Copyright: A Study of Copyright in Books, Photo-
copies, and Computer Programs, 84 HARV. L. REV. 281 (1970).
2 Id. at 281 (quoting Thomas B. Macaulay, The First Speech on Copyright, February 5,
1841, in MACAULAY’S SPEECHES ON COPYRIGHT AND LINCOLN’S ADDRESS AT COOPER UNION
18, 25 (Charles Robert Gaston ed., 1914)).
3 As Lord Macaulay said, copyright “is a tax on one of the most innocent and most salu-
tary of human pleasures; and never let us forget, that a tax on innocent pleasures is a premium
on vicious pleasures.”  Macaulay, supra note 2, at 25.
4 See Rebecca Tushnet, Copy This Essay: How Fair Use Doctrine Harms Free Speech and
How Copying Serves It, 114 YALE L.J. 535 (2004).
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In addition, today, Macaulay’s word “writers” (like the word
“writings” in the Constitution5) must be broadly construed.  In the
United States, copyrightable “writings” include music, works of visual
art, and many other fixed but nonverbal forms of creativity.6
One might thus substitute for “writers,” copyright owners “who
stand to profit in the short run from enforcement of copyright,” and
for “readers,” one might substitute “those who stand to lose in the
short run from enforcement of copyright.”7  By doing this, “reading”
becomes a broad category—it includes all effort that makes use of
previously created work, such as by copying, reading, adapting, criti-
cizing, or using for inspiration.8  Particularly as technology makes it
easier for the nonprofessional to create new works of authorship, it
has become ever clearer that copyright law needs to be concerned not
only with the incentives of copyright owners but also with the incen-
tives of those Macaulay would call “readers.”  If readers’ costs are too
high or their rewards too small, human flourishing may diminish and
cultural progress may stall.9
The structure of copyright rhetoric has been ill adapted to focus
the attention of courts and Congress on the needs of “readers.”  That
is beginning to change.  For example, instead of the “public domain”
being viewed merely as the recipient of what’s left when copyright
scope ends or copyrights expire, the public domain is increasingly rec-
ognized, through the efforts of scholars such as Professor Jessica Lit-
man, as the source of new creativity.10  Instead of “readers” being
5 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
6 17 U.S.C. § 102 (2006) (listing categories covered by copyright); Burrow-Giles Litho-
graphic Co. v. Sarony, 111 U.S. 53, 56–59 (1884).
7 In the long term, of course, readers may gain a great deal from copyright law.  The
short-term perspective is the perspective of someone wanting to use a work already created,
sometimes called the ex post perspective.  The long-term perspective is ex ante; it looks to the
future and asks, what rules will make for good results, including more works of authorship?
8 Ideas are not copyrightable, so, admittedly, “inspiration” will not trigger copyright lia-
bility.  But to be inspired, one needs access to inspiring material.  If copyright makes the price of
a book too high, some people may lack access to it, and its ideas may not find adequate expres-
sion elsewhere.  Therefore, high prices can restrict both the circulation of expression and the
circulation of ideas.
9 See Rebecca Tushnet, Economies of Desire: Fair Use and Marketplace Assumptions, 51
WM. & MARY L. REV. 513, 537–39 (2009) (“[C]reativity is a positive virtue, not just because of
its results but because of how the process of making meaning contributes to human
flourishing.”).
10 See, e.g., Jessica Litman, The Public Domain, 39 EMORY L.J. 965, 968 (1990) (“The
public domain should be understood not as the realm of material that is undeserving of protec-
tion, but as a device that permits the rest of the system to work by leaving the raw material of
authorship available for authors to use.”).
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viewed as undifferentiated consumers, Professor Julie Cohen’s notion
of “situated users” helps remind us of the diverse needs and capacities
of persons who employ copyrighted works.11  These and other ad-
vances from the scholarly literature are slowly changing the rhetorical
framework.  This Article focuses on a judicial contribution to copy-
right’s rhetorical evolution, namely, the Second Circuit’s invention of
the concept known as “fair use markets.”12
As is further explained below, the fair use doctrine13 enables the
public to engage in uses of copyrighted works that would otherwise
constitute infringement.  One of the many grounds for granting fair
use can be the lack of functioning markets through which potential
users of copyrighted works can buy licenses.14  Some scholars believe
that this means that the presence of a functioning market would doom
fair use.15  As invented and deployed by the Second Circuit, a “fair use
market” is a market that can coexist with fair use.  The Second Circuit
thus makes explicit that a technology for exchange between copyright
owners and users can be present without destroying the possibility
that a defendant might be acting properly when she uses someone
else’s copyrighted work without permission or compensation.
11 See Julie E. Cohen, Creativity and Culture in Copyright Theory, 40 U.C. DAVIS L. REV.
1151 (2007); Julie E. Cohen, The Place of the User in Copyright Law, 74 FORDHAM L. REV. 347
(2005); see also, e.g., Jessica Litman, Lawful Personal Use, 85 TEX. L. REV. 1871, 1879 (2007) (“I
urge that reading, listening, viewing, watching, playing, and using copyrighted works is at the
core of the copyright system.”).
12 The phrase comes from Castle Rock Entertainment, Inc. v. Carol Publishing Group.,
Inc., 150 F.3d 132 (2d Cir. 1998), and was given weight in Bill Graham Archives v. Dorling
Kindersley Ltd., 448 F.3d 605 (2d Cir. 2006). See infra Part I.
13 “[T]he fair use of a copyrighted work . . . is not an infringement of copyright.”  17
U.S.C. § 107 (2006). See infra Part II.C.
14 Professor Sara Stadler states that modern courts recognize only two forms of fair use:
market failure, and uses that are transformative.  Sara K. Stadler, Copyright as Trade Regulation,
155 U. PA. L. REV. 899, 905 (2007).  Professor Stadler has a somewhat narrow view of what
courts will view as a market failure, see id. at 905–06 & n.37; a somewhat broader view of market
limitations generates a multitude of bases for fair use, as does the caselaw. See Wendy J.
Gordon, Excuse and Justification in the Law of Fair Use: Transaction Costs Have Always Been
Only Part of the Story, 50 J. COPYRIGHT SOC’Y U.S.A. 149, 159–60 (2003) [hereinafter Gordon,
Excuse and Justification]; Wendy J. Gordon, Fair Use as Market Failure: A Structural and Eco-
nomic Analysis of the Betamax Case and Its Predecessors, 82 COLUM. L. REV. 1600, 1630–32
(1982) [hereinafter Gordon, Fair Use as Market Failure] (arguing that a market failure sufficient
to require a court to balance costs and benefits may be found on the bases of, inter alia, the
presence of positive externalities generated by defendants, nonmonetizable interests, and non-
commercial activities).
15 See, for example, the discussion of this trend in Lydia Pallas Loren, Redefining the Mar-
ket Failure Approach to Fair Use in an Era of Copyright Permission Systems, 5 J. INTELL. PROP.
L. 1 (1997), treated at length below.
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This may seem unexceptional; after all, because the absence of
markets is only one of many grounds for fair use, of course an uncon-
sented and uncompensated use might be “fair” whether or not a li-
cense for the use could be purchased.  But because the courts and
commentators have not been altogether clear about that proposition,16
the Second Circuit’s pronouncement is significant.
Of even more significance is the second step taken by the Second
Circuit.  It refused to weigh against a defendant’s fair use claim the
license fees that she practicably could have paid for the contested
use.17  This is one of many approaches that could be taken to accom-
modate “fair use markets.”18  The latter portions of this Article take as
their focus the conditions under which foregone fees should be
weighed.
Recognizing the existence of that “fair use market” territory im-
plies a need to further define its reach and articulate its imperatives.
Fair use is more than an amorphous area beyond “copyright markets”;
it may be a socially justified or rights-mandated19 territory capable of
pushing back against copyright’s ever-expanding borders.  Therefore
the concept of “fair use market” may help to focus attention on what
“readers” need and can contribute.
Like copyright, the common law also continually faces conun-
drums where both sides’ incentives matter.  One side may look like
the person with something to contribute, but he may not be the only
one whose behavior the law should affect.  To cite one classic exam-
ple, when a railroad’s sparks ignite hay stacked at the side of the
tracks, it is a live question whether the sparks were too many, or
whether the farmer placed his bales too close to the railroad tracks.20
16 Before the advent of “fair use markets,” courts used other methods of indicating that
markets and fair use can coexist.  For example, the Supreme Court noted that “[t]he market for
potential derivative uses includes only those that creators of original works would in general
develop or license others to develop.”  Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 592
(1994).
17 Dorling Kindersley, 448 F.3d at 615.
18 Another approach to shelter valuable uses from suppression might be to experiment
with remedial structures.  See Mark A. Lemley, Should a Licensing Market Require Licensing?,
70 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 185, 190–202 (2007).  Yet another approach might be to restrict the
rights and markets to which copyright owners are entitled. See Stadler, supra note 14 (suggesting
a redefinition of copyright infringement)
19 Although social welfare lies at the core of the instant Article, it is hardly the whole
story; fair use territory is also supported by rights.  For a partial rights-based account justifying
portions of the public domain and fair use, see Wendy J. Gordon, A Property Right in Self-
Expression: Equality and Individualism in the Natural Law of Intellectual Property, 102 YALE
L.J. 1533 (1993).
20 See R. H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1, 29–34 (1960).
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Immunize the farmer from harm by giving him rights to sue and he
may place his crops carelessly close to where the railroad engines pass;
immunize the railroad and it may neglect to install spark filters that
could inexpensively eliminate the dangers.21  In order to reliably en-
courage socially desirable behavior, both parties need to be affected
by the anticipated costs or benefits.22
That would happen virtually automatically in a world without
transaction costs, strategic behavior, imperfect knowledge, or other
forms of friction.  In such a world, affected parties could always inter-
act in a way that takes one another’s welfare into account.23  There
would be no externalities, and, as Justice Breyer intimated in his key-
note address, no need for copyright law.24  But the real world is thor-
oughly awash in transaction costs and other imperfections.  For
example, imagine how difficult it could be for the potential fans of any
artist to identify themselves, get together, and agree to pay the artist
to produce.25  Copyright law sets up markets in intangibles to help po-
tential “writers” internalize some of the benefits their works give
others, thereby encouraging the writers to invest their time, talent,
and other resources in creativity.26  But what of the readers?  We can-
not trust that a frictionless world will exist to automatically allow
21 Id.
22 Id.
23 See generally id. (explaining that a party who lacks legal rights can, in a world without
transaction costs, offer money to the parties who possess such rights to induce them to waive or
transfer those rights).  This assertion requires many caveats.
24 Stephen G. Breyer, Keynote, The Uneasy Case for Copyright: A Look Back Across
Four Decades, 79 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1635, 1642 (2011) (acknowledging that copyright would
not be needed in a world where computer software is distributed through a centralized toll
system).
25 Consider, for example, the holdout problem.  For an illustration, see Wendy J. Gordon,
Of Harms and Benefits: Torts, Restitution, and Intellectual Property, 21 J. LEGAL STUD. 449,
475–76 (1992) (“In a world without intellectual-property rights . . . , [m]any . . . potential custom-
ers may refuse to pay, preferring to gamble on the possibility that others’ monies will be suffi-
cient to draw the work into publication, when they can then make a cheap copy.  The odds on
the gamble may seem good if there is a large group of potential purchasers.  Also, the work’s
contents may be unknown since the author may be trying to trade disclosure for payment; with
the benefits uncertain, there is low perceived cost in the event the free-ride gamble fails to pay
off.  If enough people take this apparently low-cost gamble in the hope of taking a free ride, the
requisite funds may not be forthcoming.” (footnotes omitted)).
These difficulties are not always insuperable, of course.  Much of Justice Breyer’s valuable
empirical inquiry showed that significant incentives existed outside the copyright system.  On the
question of holdouts, see Breyer, supra note 1, at 303–06 (suggesting ways in which some groups
might overcome that problem, and concluding that “without copyright protection[,] organizing
buyers to channel needed funds to publishers may sometimes prove difficult but will often prove
practical”).
26 Gordon, supra note 25.
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readers’ interests to be taken into account.  Copyright markets too
have flaws that can make it difficult for works of authorship to reach
their highest-valued economic uses, not to mention the noneconomic
purposes that copyrighted works might serve.27
The common law has many ways of making sure both potential
plaintiffs and potential defendants are encouraged appropriately when
markets falter.  One such device, used in many areas of tort law where
the parties lack the advance ability to identify and bargain with each
other, is to employ an individualized, normative standard for liability,
usually identified as “reasonableness.”28  Thus, in his popular Intro-
duction to Law and Economics,29 Mitchell Polinsky suggests that if
both drivers and pedestrians can affect the frequency and intensity of
accidents, there are circumstances where a regime of either no liability
(which puts all costs on injured pedestrians) or liability without fault
(which puts all costs on injurers) is likely to be less effective than a
regime that incorporates an inquiry into negligence.30  That is, where it
is potentially important to affect both plaintiff and defendant, one de-
vice the law can use is to ask whether at least one party behaved
“reasonably.”
In copyright law, the inquiry into reasonable behavior is embed-
ded in, inter alia, the “fair use doctrine.”31  A defendant who is justi-
fied or excused32 in using another’s work without permission—a
finding arguably analogous to his being found to have behaved “rea-
sonably”33 in the sense of behaving “in a normatively acceptable man-
27 Gordon, Fair Use as Market Failure, supra note 14.
28 A plaintiff who knows she will not be reimbursed for her costs unless she proves that
the defendant acted “unreasonably” will have a monetary incentive to take care of her own
safety.  The same is true in a system where strict liability prevails but is subject to a defense of
contributory or comparative negligence.  In the accident context, of course, monetary incentives
may have a small effect in comparison with the natural desire to preserve one’s bodily integrity
against injury.
29 A. MITCHELL POLINSKY, AN INTRODUCTION TO LAW AND ECONOMICS (3d ed. 2003).
30 Id. at 47–50.  A regime that incorporates an inquiry into negligence can take many
forms, including strict liability for defendants subject to a defense that the plaintiff was contribu-
torily negligent.
31 For example, arguably a “reasonableness” inquiry is also built into tests for substantial
similarity. Cf. Shyamkrishna Balganesh, Wrongful Copying 16 (June 5, 2011) (unpublished man-
uscript) (on file with the George Washington Law Review) (discussing the “ordinary observer”
standard in the context of the test for substantial similarity); id. at 20–23 (noting that the similar-
ity assessment is a proxy for the legal wrongfulness of the defendant’s actions).
32 See Gordon, Excuse and Justification, supra note 14.
33 A link between fault in tort law and “fair use” behavior in copyright law was indepen-
dently made by Professor Steven Hetcher in an essay for the University of Pennsylvania Law
School’s Intellectual Property and the Common Law Conference held on May 6, 2011.  Steven
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ner”34—is not liable, on grounds of fair use.35  Fair use is thus one of
the most important ways to encourage a follow-on class of productive
people—those whom Macaulay called “readers” and whom we might
as easily call “authors and speakers in waiting”—to invest their own
time, effort, and resources.
This Article is addressed to two audiences.  First, like some of my
prior work and the work of many others,36 this Article addresses
scholars who think fair use should not arise where a copyright owner
can collect licensing fees from a defendant’s use.  Second, the Article
addresses those who think that courts in fair use cases should not look
at physically foregone license fees37 at all because such an inquiry
leads inexorably to a defeat for fair use.38  To both groups I argue that
it is perfectly possible within the rhetoric of markets to make the case
for fair use even when licensing revenues for the contested use are
physically available, and that sometimes it is appropriate and not cir-
cular to count the incentive effects to which those fees can give rise.
Hetcher, Copytort’s Fault Liability Standard, in COMMON LAW & INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
(Shyamkrishna Balganesh ed., forthcoming 2012).
The “reasonableness” of fair use actually does more—and thus should probably be
broader—than the “reasonableness” of negligence law.  For example, some tort defenses like
self-defense and necessity aim not at decreasing carelessness, but at avoiding overdeterrence.
They work to encourage defendants not to take too much care.  Fair use similarly aims to avoid
overdeterrence of valuable work by a defendant.  Further, copyright markets are inherently im-
perfect; short of impractical schemes such as perfect price discrimination, even well-functioning
markets for copyrighted works leave deadweight loss; not everyone who values the work above
its marginal cost will be able to purchase a copy.  The fair use doctrine may be necessary to make
the market tolerable. See, e.g., Glynn S. Lunney, Jr., Fair Use and Market Failure: Sony Revis-
ited, 82 B.U. L. REV. 975, 1030 (2002) (“Even with market success, there remains a fundamental
tension between copyright’s system of exclusive rights and the public good [nonrivalrous] char-
acter of copyrighted works. . . .  [F]air use exists in order to resolve this tension.”).
34 Note that this approach to “reasonableness” is far broader than the usual economic
characterization of “nonnegligent” behavior.  An economically nonnegligent actor takes all cost-
justified precautions.  The language of precautions does not exactly fit the copyright context.
35 The dissent in American Geophysical Union v. Texaco Inc., 60 F.3d 913 (2d Cir. 1995),
stated: “A use that is reasonable and customary is likely to be a fair one.” Id. at 934 (Jacobs, J.,
dissenting).  The majority, however, intimated that the advent of permissions systems in the jour-
nal-publishing industry had made prior notions of “reasonable” photocopying irrelevant. Id. at
924 (majority opinion).  The Texaco case is discussed further infra Part I.C.
36 See, e.g., Matthew Africa, The Misuse of Licensing Evidence in Fair Use Analysis: New
Technologies, New Markets, and the Courts, 88 CAL. L. REV. 1145 (2000); Gordon, Excuse and
Justification, supra note 14; Loren, supra note 15.
37 By “foregone license fees” I mean fees that a defendant physically could pay, in the
sense that a market for licensing existed, but which he did not pay.  If the use is “fair,” there is
no legal obligation to pay even where a licensing market exists.  Thus it may be both lawful and
proper to forego payment even when payment is a physical possibility.
38 See the discussion in Loren, supra note 15, at 32–48.
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More importantly, this Article also explores what role the Second
Circuit’s concept of “fair use market” might play.  Conceivably, the
concept could help to further the fair use doctrine’s ability to serve the
interests of Macaulay’s “readers” in two ways: by serving as a vehicle
for identifying when markets do not foreclose fair use, and by serving
as a tool for distinguishing when foregone license fees should not be
counted against the defendant as part of the fair use calculus.  I con-
clude this Article by considering the commodification literature and
other sources as a guide to factors that can serve these two functions
of the “fair use market” category.  Although my list is hardly exhaus-
tive, I hope it will stimulate others to assist in fleshing out this intrigu-
ing doctrinal tool.
I. AN ANALYSIS OF THE FOURTH FAIR USE FACTOR
A. Background to the Fair Use Doctrine
Fair use is a judicially created doctrine that is still open to judicial
evolution, despite being statutorily recognized in the Copyright Act.39
Fair use permits free use of copyrighted materials even when the use
superficially appears to fit one of the categories that the statute places
within the copyright owner’s control.40  Traditional examples of fair
use include a critic copying quotations from a book being reviewed, a
musical parody borrowing some of the melody from a song being ridi-
culed, and an English teacher getting a new idea for her class and
spontaneously photocopying a short literary excerpt to illustrate the
idea to her students.41  Technological advances have opened up a wide
variety of additional possibilities for fair use; for example, the Internet
and inexpensive reprography and video equipment make it easier for
members of Macaulay’s “reader” group to become authors and pub-
lishers themselves.42  Preserving good incentives for this group, there-
39 17 U.S.C. §§ 101–1332 (2006); see also id. § 107 (recognizing fair use and providing a
nonexclusive four-factor test to evaluate fair use claims); H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 66 (1976),
reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659, 5679 (“Beyond a very broad statutory explanation of what
fair use is and some of the criteria applicable to it, the courts must be free to adapt the doctrine
to particular situations on a case-by-case basis.”).
40 See, e.g., Gordon, Fair Use as Market Failure, supra note 14.
41 The fair use statute gives as illustrative purposes, “[p]urposes such as criticism, com-
ment, news reporting, teaching (including multiple copies for classroom use), scholarship, or
research.”  17 U.S.C. § 107.
42 At the same time, as technology has empowered ordinary users, the scope and length of
copyright has expanded. See, e.g., Jessica Litman, The Exclusive Right to Read, 13 CARDOZO
ARTS & ENT. L.J. 29 (1994); Loren, supra note 15.
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fore, becomes ever more important,43 and the fair use doctrine aims
at, inter alia, preserving such “reader” incentives.
Copyright law primarily operates through two aspects: a “private
rights” component and a “commons” component.44  In its “private
rights” component, copyright law creates markets in which copyright
owners are given veto power over potential uses of their work.45  In its
“commons” component, copyright law creates areas free for public ac-
cess and use by declining to provide or modifying exclusionary rights.
Through temporal and subject-matter boundaries, and a host of spe-
cific and general limits, Congress gives a set of liberty rights
(Hohfeldian “privileges”)46 to the public—liberties that are so strong
that the “federal right to copy and to use”47 can sometimes preempt
state law attempts to re-enclose the common.  Fair use operates to
allow the “commons” side of copyright to govern in appropriate cases.
To the extent that problems exist in any particular market—ei-
ther because of economic considerations like transaction costs and ex-
ternalities, or because of the market’s inherent inabilities to mediate
all values of social importance—deferring to the copyright owner can-
not be relied upon to best serve the social interests at stake.48  Among
other things, I have suggested that if no market existed for a given use
because transaction costs were high, then enforcing the copyright
would cause harm without any countervailing benefit, and fair use
should be granted.49  That was only one way in which markets could
fail; another mode of market failure is the presence of nonmonetiz-
able interests;50 another, emphasized later by Professor Lydia Loren
as one of the most important,51 would arise if a defendant generated
43 See, e.g., Molly Shaffer Van Houweling, Distributive Values in Copyright, 83 TEX. L.
REV. 1535 (2005).  Professor Van Houweling also points out that the need for the “writer” side
to have copyright protection may be less, as technological advances reduce their cost of dissemi-
nation. Id. at 1539.
44 Brett M. Frischmann & Mark A. Lemley, Spillovers, 107 COLUM. L. REV. 257, 285
(2007).
45 See generally Gordon, Excuse and Justification, supra note 14, at 157–58; Gordon, Fair
Use as Market Failure, supra note 14, at 1619.
46 See generally Wesley Newcomb Hohfeld, Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied in
Judicial Reasoning, 26 YALE L.J. 710 (1917).
47 Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141, 165 (1989) (internal quo-
tation marks omitted) (preempting state law that granted exclusion rights in unpatented boat
hulls).  The Court’s opinion addressed patent law, but later in the same paragraph, in one of the
supporting quotations, the opinion referred to copyright law as well. Id.
48 See Gordon, Fair Use as Market Failure, supra note 14, at 1613–14.
49 Id. at 1618.
50 Id. at 1630–32.
51 Loren, supra note 15, at 26, 49–57.  Professor Loren’s article not only emphasizes the
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social benefit that he could not capture monetarily.52  In these in-
stances, we cannot rely on copyright markets to reach socially desira-
ble outcomes.
The approach just described begins with markets and asks when
they fail to work well.  An alternative approach to market suitability
would be to start with nonmarket orderings and ask when they suc-
ceed.  Thus, one might explicate the circumstances under which one or
another nonmarket ordering (such as a realm of sharing or gift where
payment for unauthorized use is not compelled by law, or setting up a
commons regulated by its members) might thrive, and compare its
failures and successes with that of alternative orderings including mar-
kets.  This Article joins others in the scholarly community to begin the
task of combining the market and nonmarket starting points.53
The Copyright Act itself lists four nonexhaustive factors to con-
sider when deciding whether a use is “fair.”54  Of these, arguably the
most important is the fourth factor, “the effect of the use upon the
category of “defendants who generate positive externalities”; it also deepens our understanding
of the category by, inter alia, emphasizing the difficulty courts would have in measuring diffuse
benefits.  For a discussion of related topics, see, for example, Frischmann & Lemley, supra note
44, at 279–80, 285.
52 Gordon, Fair Use as Market Failure, supra note 14, at 1630–32.  I refer here to persons
who generate positive spillover effects, or “positive externalities.”  This differs from “nonmone-
tizable interests.”  A nonmonetizable interest is an interest like free speech whose value we do
not want to measure in money, and is therefore unsuitable for trading on a market.  A positive
externality is a benefit someone creates for which he is not recompensed; the recompense might
or might not be monetary in nature.
53 The ultimate choice should be comparative among various institutional options.
54 The Copyright Act defines fair use as follows:
Notwithstanding the provisions of sections 106 and 106A, the fair use of a
copyrighted work, including such use by reproduction in copies or phonorecords or
by any other means specified by that section, for purposes such as criticism, com-
ment, news reporting, teaching (including multiple copies for classroom use), schol-
arship, or research, is not an infringement of copyright.  In determining whether the
use made of a work in any particular case is a fair use the factors to be considered
shall include—
(1) the purpose and character of the use, including whether such use is of a
commercial nature or is for nonprofit educational purposes;
(2) the nature of the copyrighted work;
(3) the amount and substantiality of the portion used in relation to the copy-
righted work as a whole; and
(4) the effect of the use upon the potential market for or value of the copy-
righted work.
The fact that a work is unpublished shall not itself bar a finding of fair use if such
finding is made upon consideration of all the above factors.
17 U.S.C. § 107 (2006).
Note that the statute uses the word “include.”  The Copyright Act defines the term “includ-
ing” as “illustrative and not limitative.” Id. § 101.
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potential market for or value of the copyrighted work.”55  This Article
focuses on that fourth factor and the impact of physically foregone
license fees on the fair use calculus.
B. The Concern with the Market Failure Test
The market failure test for fair use has been misinterpreted as
implying that fair use should exist only where high transaction costs
completely bar a market from arising.56  As transaction costs decrease,
some argued, fair use should begin to disappear.  Justice Blackmun,
dissenting in a 1984 Supreme Court case, Sony Corp. of America v.
Universal City Studios, Inc.,57 implicitly articulated such an approach:
“[T]he infringer must demonstrate that he had not impaired the copy-
right holder’s ability to demand compensation from (or to deny access
to) any group who would otherwise be willing to pay to see or hear
the copyrighted work.”58  By implication, the presence of any market
avenues that might allow a “group” to pay would foreclose fair use.59
55 Id. § 107.  Debate over the factor’s importance is rife.  One of the most intriguing obser-
vations is Professor Barton Beebe’s:
Ultimately, the paradox of the fourth factor is that it is everything in the fair use
test and thus nothing.  To assert, as a descriptive matter, that it is the most impor-
tant factor—or, as a normative matter, that it is too important—is meaningless,
primarily because it is no factor, no independent variable, at all.  Instead, regardless
of what we might hope—or fear—it would be, the actual doctrine of the fourth
factor consists in practice of a few propositions of law that judges should keep in
mind as they synthesize the various factual findings that they have made under the
previous factors . . . .  In practice, judges appear to apply section 107 in the form of
a cognitively more familiar two-sided balancing test in which they weigh the
strength of the defendant’s justification for its use, as that justification has been
developed in the first three factors, against the impact of that use on the incentives
of the plaintiff.  Factor four provides the analytical space for this balancing test to
occur, and the various doctrinal propositions under factor four are merely there to
tilt the scales one way or the other.
Barton Beebe, An Empirical Study of U.S. Copyright Fair Use Opinions, 1978-2005, 156 U. PA.
L. REV. 549, 620–21 (2008) (footnotes omitted).
56 I have been incorrectly interpreted as arguing that “the impossibility of arriving at bar-
gains [is] the essential justification for the doctrine of fair use.”  David Lindsay, The Future of the
Fair Dealing Defense to Copyright Infringement 62 (Centre for Media, Comm’ns & Info. Tech.
Law, The Univ. of Melbourne, Research Paper No. 12, 2000); see also Wendy J. Gordon, Market
Failure and Intellectual Property: A Response to Professor Lunney, 82 B.U. L. REV. 1031,
1031–32 (2002); cf. Robert P. Merges, The End of Friction?: Property Rights and Contract in the
“Newtonian” World of On-Line Commerce, 12 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 115, 130–31 (1997)
(describing transaction-cost barriers between owners and users as having become “the prevailing
view” of fair use, but distinguishing my view as being broader).
57 Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417 (1984).
58 Id. at 485 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
59 In my interpretation of Justice Blackmun and his impact, I am indebted to Frank Pas-
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Some saw no great evil in substituting “fared use” for “fair use,”60 but
most disagreed sharply.  That a use could be paid for did not mean it
should be.61
The Supreme Court’s interpretation of fair use in a later case,
Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc.,62 made it clear that fair use could
survive a drastic reduction of transaction costs between a copyrighted
work’s owner and its user.  In Campbell, the copyright owner and de-
fendant were in communication with each other,63 so whatever trans-
action costs existed between them could not have swamped a mutually
beneficial transaction.  The Court held that, despite the potential for
face-to-face bargaining, fair use for a parody could exist.64
Yet the Campbell opinion gave only limited comfort to those who
were legitimately concerned that mere reductions in transaction costs
could be misapplied to doom fair use.  For in Campbell, there was a
reason other than transaction costs to suspect that no market existed.
The Court based its decision in large part on a finding that there was
no market for criticism: “[T]he unlikelihood that creators of imagina-
tive works will license critical reviews or lampoons of their own pro-
ductions removes such uses from the very notion of a potential
licensing market.  People ask . . . for criticism, but they only want
praise.”65  So after Campbell, we knew that transaction costs between
owner and user were not the only barrier to markets that counted, but
we still did not have a definitive Supreme Court holding that fair use
was applicable even where a market appeared.  Both logic and history
quale, Breaking the Vicious Circularity: Sony’s Contribution to the Fair Use Doctrine, 55 CASE W.
RES. L. REV. 777 (2005).
60 The phrase “fared use” is Professor Tom Bell’s.  Tom W. Bell, Fair Use vs. Fared Use:
The Impact of Automated Rights Management on Copyright’s Fair Use Doctrine, 76 N.C. L. REV.
557 (1998) (describing benefits of fared use).
61 This formulation is Matthew Africa’s.  Africa, supra note 36, at 1148–49 (“[I]t is a mis-
take to think that just because a use could have been licensed it should have been licensed.”); see
also, e.g., Pasquale, supra note 59, at 779 n.9 (citing Gordon, supra note 56, for the proposition
that “[Professor Gordon] clearly does not take the position that all uses that can be paid for
should be paid for”).
Also, assuming that all physically collectible license fees should be charged is akin to the
problem of confusing “value” with “property.” See Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, Expressive
Genericity: Trademarks as Language in the Pepsi Generation, 65 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 397,
404–12 (1990) (discussing and critiquing the supposed logic of the “if value, then right”
paradigm).
62 Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569 (1994).
63 Id. at 572.
64 Id. (holding that a “parody’s commercial character is only one element to be weighed in
a fair use enquiry”).
65 Id. at 592 (internal quotation marks omitted).
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suggested that the Supreme Court in fact would take this position
(namely, that fair use can exist despite the presence of licensing), but
lower court developments raised the apparent stakes.
C. Case Developments After Campbell
Two circuit court cases, American Geophysical Union v. Texaco
Inc.,66 decided by the Second Circuit, and Princeton University Press v.
Michigan Document Services, Inc. (“MDS”),67 decided by the Sixth
Circuit, strengthened many observers’ concerns that fair use could
shrink or disappear as markets spread.  The courts’ holdings imposed
liability for photocopying performed by a scientific researcher and a
producer of academic course packs, respectively, largely on the
ground that some avenues for licensing existed.68  The cases were usu-
ally taken to suggest that even the presence of a partial market (in
MDS, for example, the Copyright Clearance Center covered some,
but not all,69 of the material affected) could doom fair use.70  Many
commentators accused the courts of circularity71: treating physically
foregone license fees as a ground for liability on the basis of an un-
stated assumption that such license fees were owed for the contested
use.72
66 Am. Geophysical Union v. Texaco Inc., 60 F.3d 913 (2d Cir. 1995).
67 Princeton Univ. Press v. Mich. Document Servs., Inc. (MDS), 99 F.3d 1381 (6th Cir.
1996) (en banc).
68 MDS, 99 F.3d at 1388; Texaco, 60 F.3d at 930–31.
69 Texaco, 60 F.3d at 936–39 (Jacobs, J., dissenting) (“There is nothing workable, and there
is no market.”).
70 See Loren, supra note 15, at 6 (“In Princeton University Press v. Michigan Document
Services, Inc., and American Geophysical Union v. Texaco, Inc., the courts rejected claims of fair
use because the copyright owners had established permission systems for licensing the types of
uses at issue.” (footnotes omitted)).  Professor Loren identifies a “narrow[ ]” interpretation of
fair use, under which, “if a copyright owner can establish an efficient ‘permission system’ to
collect fees for a certain kind of use, then a copyright owner will be able to defeat a claim of fair
use.” Id. at 7.
Professor Loren continues by explaining that “[t]his limited view of fair use has the poten-
tial to allow copyright owners to control all uses of their works.” Id.  This latter claim of course
is an overstatement; fair use does not expand the scope of rights beyond what is facially granted
by the Copyright Act.
71 See Christina Bohannan, Copyright Harm, Foreseeability, and Fair Use, 85 WASH. U. L.
REV. 969, 971 (2007); Christina Bohannan & Herbert Hovenkamp, IP and Antitrust: Reforma-
tion and Harm, 51 B.C. L. REV. 905, 973–74 (2010); Mark A. Lemley, The Law and Economics
of Internet Norms, 73 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1257, 1277 n.98 (1998); Lunney, supra note 33; Pamela
Samuelson, Unbundling Fair Uses, 77 FORDHAM L. REV. 2537, 2620 (2009) (discussing the con-
troversy); Sara K. Stadler, Incentive and Expectation in Copyright, 58 HASTINGS L.J. 433, 457–59
(2007).
72 See Loren, supra note 15, at 38–41; Pasquale, Toward an Ecology of Intellectual Prop-
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In my view,73 the Second Circuit has tried to respond to this con-
cern.74  In Texaco itself, the opinion recognized the circularity danger,
but denied that its own analysis was circular.  The opinion stated that
“[t]he vice of circular reasoning arises only if the availability of pay-
ment is conclusive against fair use.”75  Although virtually no commen-
tator acquitted the court of the charge of circularity,76 this Article
attempts to show that the charge was overstated.
In addition to directly addressing the circularity issue, the Texaco
opinion emphasized that any license fees the defendant could have
paid should be held against such defendant under the fair use statute’s
fourth factor only in “normal” markets.77  That fourth factor, “the ef-
fect of the use upon the potential market for or value of the copy-
righted work,”78 would not take foregone license fees into account if
the fees came from a market that was abnormal or nontraditional.
That stance also failed to persuade the commentators that fair use
could effectively guard the interest of copyright defendants.  Among
other things, the commentators saw the possibility that publishers and
other copyright owners could strategically manipulate any new use to
look as if a normal permissions market existed.79
erty: Lessons from Environmental Economics for Valuing Copyright’s Commons, 8 YALE J.L. &
TECH. 78, 91 & n. 53 (2006) (citing Loren, supra note 15).
73 In presenting my view of various cases, I am not arguing my interpretation is compelled;
rather, I argue that my interpretation constitutes one permissible reading.
74 I do not know whether the judges were influenced by the commentators; in the Texaco
opinion and elsewhere, the judges showed that they were sensitive to similar matters as those
that concerned the commentators. See Blanch v. Koons, 467 F.3d 244, 258 n.9 (2d Cir. 2006)
(“[I]t is of course circular to assert simply that if we were to hold in [plaintiff’s] favor she could
then charge [defendant] for his further use of [the copyrighted work].”).
The clearest indicator of the Second Circuit’s concern with preserving fair use against undue
shrinkage from foregone-fee analysis probably came in Dorling Kindersley, discussed infra Part
I.D.
75 Am. Geophysical Union v. Texaco Inc., 60 F.3d 913, 931 (2d Cir. 1995).
76 See, e.g., Frischmann & Lemley, supra note 44, at 290; Loren, supra note 15, at 38–39.
77 Wrote the court:
[N]ot every effect on potential licensing revenues enters the analysis under the
fourth factor.  Specifically, courts have recognized limits on the concept of potential
licensing revenues by considering only markets that are traditional, reasonable, or
likely to be developed markets when examining and assessing a secondary use’s
effect upon the potential market for or value of the copyrighted work.
Texaco, 60 F.3d at 929–930 (footnote and internal quotation marks omitted).
78 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2006).
79 See, e.g., Loren, supra note 15, at 41–44.  She writes:
If a copyright owner, or an industry of copyright owners, convince[s] enough users
to pay for a certain type of use, then the “price” becomes customary.  Often the
first users to pay the requested fees are those copyright owners in the industry who,
through a gentlemen’s agreement, have undertaken to pay fees.
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The Second Circuit then went out of its way, in Castle Rock En-
tertainment, Inc. v. Carol Publishing Group, Inc.,80 to argue that such
manipulative behavior would be ineffective.  Some uses could not be
made unfair by the copyright owner offering licenses;81 the court gave
as examples “parody, news reporting, educational or other transform-
ative uses of its own creative work,” and characterized these uses as
belonging to “fair use markets.”82  The court wrote that “copyright
owners may not preempt exploitation of transformative markets,
which they would not in general develop or license others to develop,
by actually developing or licensing others to develop those markets.”83
That language was encouraging, but it, too, was less than fully
persuasive.
First, the language was in a footnote, as dicta in a case holding
that there was no fair use; it was not binding.  Second, the language
overstates the ability of a market’s presence to foreclose fair use.  It is
an extremely rare case indeed where the only basis for fair use is the
Id. at 41.
80 Castle Rock Entm’t, Inc. v. Carol Publ’g Grp., Inc., 150 F.3d 132 (2d Cir. 1998).
81 Presumably some such uses could be made unfair (infringing) by considerations other
than the copyright owner’s new creation of a market.  Examples of such other considerations
might include the defendant’s bad faith, or his use causing substantial substitutionary damage to
the plaintiff’s pre-existing markets.
82 Wrote the court:
[C]opyright owners may not preempt exploitation of transformative markets, which
they would not “in general develop or license others to develop,” by actually devel-
oping or licensing others to develop those markets.  Thus, by developing or licens-
ing a market for parody, news reporting, educational or other transformative uses
of its own creative work, a copyright owner plainly cannot prevent others from
entering those fair use markets. See 4 Nimmer § 13.05[A][4], at 13-181 to -182 (rec-
ognizing “danger of circularity” where original copyright owner redefines “poten-
tial market” by developing or licensing others to develop that market); Texaco, 60
F.3d at 930 (“Only an impact on potential licensing revenues for traditional, rea-
sonable, or likely to be developed markets” is relevant to fourth factor.).
Castle Rock, 150 F.3d at 145 n.11 (second emphasis added).
Footnote eleven in the Castle Rock opinion ended with a citation to Texaco, as if insisting
that this new view was consistent with that prior case.  (Recall that Texaco stated that “[o]nly an
impact on potential licensing revenues for traditional, reasonable, or likely to be developed mar-
kets” is relevant to the fourth factor. Texaco, 60 F.3d at 930.)  It is unclear whether the Castle
Rock court was merely papering over a real change—as Professor Beebe argues the Supreme
Court has often done on fair use matters, Beebe, supra note 55, at 596—or whether the court
was accurately explaining part of what it meant in Texaco.  Professor Beebe has argued about
Supreme Court practice by which “the Court has repeatedly sought to reconstrue what it should
have explicitly rescinded and replaced.  This practice has proven to be a disaster for fair use
doctrine.” Id. at 596–97.
The question of reconstruction versus replacement also arises concerning the way the Sec-
ond Circuit in Dorling Kindersley manipulated its quotation of Castle Rock. See infra Part I.D.
83 Castle Rock, 150 F.3d at 145 n.11 (internal quotation marks omitted).
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lack of markets between the copyright owner and user; it is hard to
imagine one.  Even in the classic cases typically cited as using a mar-
ket failure approach to fair use, additional factors were relevant that
might have favored the unauthorized uses at issue even had there
been a market.84
Third, the reference to copyright owners “preempting” markets
intimated that the court’s only concern may have been to block copy-
right owners’ efforts at strategic behavior.  But the court’s concern
should have been broader.  As Professor James Gibson later pointed
out, even innocent nonstrategic behavior by risk-averse users of copy-
righted material could result in de facto markets expanding.85
Fourth, and probably most important, the Castle Rock language
was not only dicta, but murky: did the special treatment apply to all
transformative uses, or only those transformative uses not embraced
by normal and customary markets?86  Custom has been urged as a
guide to fair use by some,87 but has been questioned as an often unre-
liable guide by many others.88  An ambiguous comma left open the
84 For example, in Williams & Wilkins Co. v. United States, 487 F.2d 1345 (Ct. Cl. 1973),
aff’d by an equally divided Court, 420 U.S. 376 (1975) (per curiam), the photocopies at issue
were made for the sake of medical research.  Given the positive spillovers such uses generate but
which researchers are unlikely to fully capture, many users may have been unable to purchase
licenses even if licenses had been available.  The importance of medical progress might have
persuaded the court in favor of fair use regardless of market presence, particularly if the court
perceived, as it seemed to, that the publishers did not need additional fees in order to continue.
Similarly, in Sony, home users were making VCR recordings of copyrighted television programs.
Even if there had been a license available, factors existed that favored fair use such as concerns
with maintaining the privacy of the home and concerns with the fact that the shows had been
freely broadcasted.  Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 454 (1983).
85 James Gibson, Risk Aversion and Rights Accretion in Intellectual Property Law, 116
YALE L.J. 882, 900–01 (2007) (“One of the interesting things about the doctrinal feedback phe-
nomenon is that it works an expansion of the copyright entitlement in an inadvertent, accretive
manner . . . .  It is an independent phenomenon that works its expansion regardless of whether
courts and legislatures favor that outcome and regardless of whether copyright owners engage in
rent-seeking behavior.”).
86 Note the way Castle Rock cited Texaco.  See Castle Rock, 150 F.3d at 145 n.11, discussed
in note 82, supra.
87 Lloyd L. Weinreb, Fair’s Fair: A Comment on the Fair Use Doctrine, 103 HARV. L. REV.
1137, 1140 (1990) (“Although I agree that the general purpose of copyright importantly affects
the question whether a use is fair, a number of other factors also have to be taken into account,
among which customary practice and the prevailing understanding of what constitutes fair con-
duct in the circumstances are the most important.”).  Weinreb was not primarily concerned with
the foregone license fee issue, however. Id.
88 For cautions on the use of custom in fair use, see Africa, supra note 36, at 1173–75;
Gibson, supra note 85, at 897–98; Loren, supra note 15, at 41; Jennifer E. Rothman, The Ques-
tionable Use of Custom in Intellectual Property, 93 VA. L. REV. 1899, 1905, 1930–67 (2007).
Investigating the use and misuse of custom as a guide to law has a copious literature. See, e.g.,
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question of custom’s importance even for transformative
works.89
D. Dorling Kindersley and Fair Use Markets
In 2006, the Second Circuit took a definitive turn from the largely
descriptive (“normal,” “customary,” “traditional,” “reasonable,”90 or
“likely to be developed” markets) to the normative.  In Bill Graham
Archives v. Dorling Kindersley Ltd.,91 a dispute arose over whether
the publisher of a history of the Grateful Dead could rely on fair use
to reprint thumbnail-size reproductions of copyrighted concert pos-
ters.92  The Second Circuit announced that such uses of existing works
were transformative and that transformative works belonged in “fair
use markets.”93  This time the pronouncement came not as dicta, but
as part of a holding, and it truncated the ambiguous language (with its
ambiguous comma) from Castle Rock to announce what seemed to be
a clear rule based not on common practice or custom or the availabil-
ity of markets, but rather on a normatively significant characteristic of
the use, its transformativeness: “[A] copyright holder cannot prevent
others from entering fair use markets merely by developing or licens-
ing a market for parody, news reporting, educational or other trans-
formative uses of its own creative work.”94
However, there are problems in the Dorling Kindersley concept
of “fair use markets,” not the least of which being that a finding of
“fair use market” was triggered by the defendant having made a
Lisa Bernstein, Merchant Law in a Merchant Court: Rethinking the Code’s Search for Immanent
Business Norms, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 1765 (1996).
Custom may have a unique role when it comes to commodification issues.  See the discus-
sion in Part.II.C, infra.
89 Note the comma after “markets” in this phrase from Castle Rock: “[C]opyright owners
may not preempt exploitation of transformative markets, which they would not ‘in general de-
velop or license others to develop’ . . . .” Castle Rock, 150 F.3d at 145 n.11.
The comma suggests that the court meant that copyright owners cannot block (“preempt”)
fair use whenever there is a transformative market.  Yet the substance of the clause after the
comma suggests that the court meant something narrower: that copyright owners cannot block
fair use when there is a transformative market that is also a market that the owners would not
“in general develop or license others to develop.” Id. (emphasis omitted).  That is, the comma
left unclear whether special treatment was triggered by transformativity alone, or by transforma-
tivity coupled with an abnormal market.
90 The notions of “reasonable” or “normal” markets have obvious potential for normative
development as well.
91 Bill Graham Archives v. Dorling Kindersley Ltd., 448 F.3d 605 (2d Cir. 2006).
92 Id. at 607.
93 Id. at 615.
94 Id. at 614–15 (emphasis added) (internal quotation marks omitted).
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“transformative” use of the plaintiff’s copyrighted work.95  Concep-
tually, that posed quite a conundrum.  Because section 106(2) of the
Copyright Act96 gives the copyright owner exclusive control over de-
rivative works, and because derivative works explicitly include trans-
formative use of others’ copyrighted work,97 it looked as if the Second
Circuit’s new approach might threaten to distort the derivative work
right.98  Whether for this reason or others, Professor Barton Beebe’s
empirical study of fair use cases shows that although transformative-
ness as a fair use factor remains important, it has gradually dropped in
popularity among judges.99  As for “fair use market” as a doctrinal
category, the concept has surfaced occasionally in the cases since it
was introduced, but has done little work there.
95 Id. at 615.  The defendant produced a book about the history of the Grateful Dead; in
doing so, it had reduced the size of the plaintiff’s copyrighted images (posters and concert tickets
for the Grateful Dead), coupled them with other material, and used them for a purpose different
from the original. Id. at 607.
96 17 U.S.C. § 106 (2006) (“Subject to sections 107 through 122, the owner of copyright
under this title has the exclusive rights to . . . prepare derivative works based upon the copy-
righted work.”).
97 Id. § 101.
98 See 2 PAUL GOLDSTEIN, GOLDSTEIN ON COPYRIGHT § 12.2.2(c), at 12:40 (3d ed. Supp.
2011). But see R. Anthony Reese, Transformativeness and the Derivative Work Right, 31
COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 467, 494 (2008) (arguing that the fair use notion of “transformativeness”
does not “inappropriately interfere with copyright owners’ right to control ordinary derivative
works”).  Professor Reese examines the cases between the Supreme Court’s 1994 decision in
Campbell and the end of 2007.  He finds that, with one exception, the accumulated opinions
accommodate a distinct meaning for “transformative” in fair use cases: the courts treat as key to
transformativeness “the purpose of the defendant’s use.” Id.  By contrast, in derivative work
cases, the courts typically emphasize not a change in purpose, but whether the content of the
work has been creatively altered.
Even if this trend in fair use law continues, unanswered questions attach to transformative-
ness, both as to its normative basis and its descriptive clarity. Id. at 494–95; see also 2 GOLD-
STEIN, supra, § 12.2.2(c), at 12:32–:40 (questioning the use of transformativeness in general, and
suggesting that the “change of purpose” inquiry is dangerously expansive).  That transformative-
ness remains problematic in fair use is emphasized in Thomas F. Cotter, Transformative Use and
Cognizable Harm, 12 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 701 (2010).  Professor Cotter urges courts judg-
ing fair use cases to deemphasize “tranformativeness.”  It may be that the emphasis on transfor-
mation is responsible, as a background source of strain, for some odd developments in both fair
use and derivative work doctrine. See, e.g., Ty, Inc. v. Publ’ns Int’l Ltd., 292 F.3d 512, 517–18
(7th Cir. 2002) (controversial application of the notion of complementarity in a fair use case);
Warner Bros. Entm’t Inc. v. RDR Books, 575 F. Supp. 2d 513, 538–39 (S.D.N.Y. 2008) (contro-
versial new test for derivative works); see also Cotter, supra, at 708–30.
I argue below that transformativeness is incomplete as a criterion for disregarding foregone
license fees, whether understood as alteration of content, or as alteration of purpose.  I suggest
that there are some bases for disregarding license fees that have nothing to do with transforma-
tiveness under either definition. See infra Part II.C, II.F.
99 Beebe, supra note 55, at 603–06.
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In Dorling Kindersley, the Second Circuit—one of the two most
influential circuits on matters of fair use100—seems to have been trying
to make a clear space for fair use even in the presence of potential
licensing.  Conceivably, the notion of “fair use markets” has made lit-
tle progress because the Second Circuit not only made the point that
fair use can coexist with licensing markets, but went on to eliminate
consideration of foregone license fees in an extremely wide group of
cases.  That second step may have been too extreme for later courts to
emulate.
This Article suggests some revised criteria for identifying a subset
of fair use markets that warrant such disregarding of license fees.
These criteria go beyond (and reach within) the troubling criterion of
“transformativeness” that the Second Circuit itself used when creating
the “fair use markets” category.101
E. Reexamining Texaco
To better understand the role that “fair use markets” might play,
let us turn to the question of whether Texaco’s approach to physically
foregone license fees really forecloses fair use whenever markets ap-
pear.  As mentioned, the Second Circuit in the Texaco majority opin-
ion itself argued that it was not “circular” to count license fees for a
contested use against the defendant for factor four purposes.102  Wrote
the court:
[I]t is not unsound to conclude that the right to seek payment
for a particular use tends to become legally cognizable under
the fourth fair use factor when the means for paying for such
a use is made easier.  This notion is not inherently troubling:
it is sensible that a particular unauthorized use should be
considered “more fair” when there is no ready market or
means to pay for the use, while such an unauthorized use
should be considered “less fair” when there is a ready mar-
ket or means to pay for the use. The vice of circular reason-
ing arises only if the availability of payment is conclusive
against fair use.103
100 Id. 567–68.
101 For discussion of the difficulties raised by transformativeness, see supra note 98, infra
notes 151, 191–92 and accompanying text.
102 Factor four is “the effect of the use upon the potential market for or value of the copy-
righted work.”  17 U.S.C. § 107(4).  For discussions of courts’ treatment of factor four, see, for
example, Beebe, supra note 55, at 557–64, and Pasquale, supra note 59.
103 Am. Geophysical Union v. Texaco Inc., 60 F.3d 913, 930–31 (2d Cir. 1995) (emphasis
added).  The court continued:
Whatever the situation may have been previously, before the development of a
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As noted, the Second Circuit’s opinion has nevertheless been
strongly criticized by virtually all commentators on the ground of cir-
cularity.104  In the words of Professor Loren’s excellent article: “The
argument that ‘lost’ permission fees are proof of fourth factor harm
has as its premise the legal conclusion at issue: that the use at issue is
not a fair use . . . .”105  Or as the Court of Claims stated in a 1973
decision, “‘[T]o measure the detriment to plaintiff by loss of pre-
sumed royalty income . . . assume[s] at the start the merit of the plain-
tiff’s position.’”106  But is this right?  Does the Texaco court, as a
logical matter, necessarily assume that the copyright owner has the
best of the argument from the start?107
Similar criticisms based on circularity were addressed to the Sixth
Circuit for its decision in MDS.108  In both Texaco and MDS, the
courts weighed heavily against the defendants the possibility that they
could have purchased licenses for the material they photocopied.109
Although there are many problems with Texaco, it is not necessa-
rily true that the court began by assuming the copyright owner had an
entitlement to control the contested use.  There may have been circu-
market for institutional users to obtain licenses to photocopy articles, it is now ap-
propriate to consider the loss of licensing revenues in evaluating “the effect of the
use upon the potential market for or value of” journal articles.  It is especially ap-
propriate to do so with respect to copying of articles from . . . a publication as to
which a photocopying license is now available.  We do not decide how the fair use
balance would be resolved if a photocopying license . . . were not currently
available.
Id. at 931 (citation omitted).
104 See supra note 71.
105 Loren, supra note 15, at 38.
106 Id. at 39 (quoting Williams & Wilkins Co. v. United States, 487 F.2d 1345, 1357 n.19 (Ct.
Cl. 1973), aff’d by an equally divided Court, 420 U.S. 376 (1975) (per curiam)).
107 The dissent also accused the majority of circularity, but of a “self-fulfilling prophecy”
sort rather than as a logical error. See Texaco, 60 F.3d at 937 (Jacobs, J., dissenting).  Wrote the
dissent:
In this case the only harm to a market is to the supposed market in photocopy
licenses.  The CCC scheme is neither traditional nor reasonable; and its develop-
ment into a real market is subject to substantial impediments. There is a circularity
to the problem: the market will not crystallize unless courts reject the fair use argu-
ment that Texaco presents; but, under the statutory test, we cannot declare a use to
be an infringement unless (assuming other factors also weigh in favor of the secon-
dary user) there is a market to be harmed.  At present, only a fraction of journal
publishers have sought to exact these fees.  I would hold that this fourth factor
decisively weighs in favor of Texaco, because there is no normal market in photo-
copy licenses, and no real consensus among publishers that there ought to be one.
Id. (emphases added).
108 MDS, 99 F.3d 1381 (6th Cir. 1996) (en banc).
109 Id. at 1387; Texaco, 60 F.3d at 930–31.
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larity, but not of that form.  (There are many forms of circularity, not
all of which are necessarily bad.110  A less pejorative form of circular-
ity, for example, is the familiar notion of “feedback loops.”111)  A bad
circular argument is commonly defined as one that “commits the logi-
cal fallacy of assuming what it is attempting to prove.”112  This the
Texaco court does not do, for it is possible to take the incentive effects
of physically foregone license fees into account and yet find fair use
for the defendant.  The following numerical example will illustrate.
F. Numerical Illustration
“Foregone license fees” is simply another term for part of the
value that the defendant’s use generates.113  But who should capture
that value?  The copyright owner, the defendant, the public in general,
or some mixture thereof?114  And what if the plaintiff’s enforcement of
fees means that the defendant’s use will not occur?  How is that loss
(and the loss of what would be built on the defendant’s work) to be
calculated?  Note that in the following analysis, foregone incentives of
the defendant115 and the community play as large a role as the plain-
tiff’s foregone incentives.
110 I am indebted here to Professor Mike Meurer.
111 See, e.g., Douglas N. Walton, The Essential Ingredients of the Fallacy of Begging the
Question, in FALLACIES: CLASSICAL AND CONTEMPORARY READINGS 229 (Hans V. Hansen &
Robert C. Pinto eds., 1995).  Walton writes of feedback loops:
It’s like the situation of a diabetic who, as he becomes more overweight, builds up
more insulin in his blood, which makes him eat more, and consequently store up
more fat.  The process is circular, but there is no fallacy in it.  That’s the way reality
sometimes is.  Similarly in mathematical reasoning, proving conclusion A from
starting point B, and then proving B from A, could be a quite legitimate equiva-
lence proof.  From the circular reasoning alone, it doesn’t follow that a fallacy has
been committed.
Id. at 233–34 (internal quotation marks omitted).
112 Richard Nordquist, Circular Argument, ABOUT.COM, http://grammar.about.com/od/c/g/
circargterm.htm (last visited July 19, 2011).  The nature and definition of logically circular argu-
ments (also known as the fallacy of “begging the question”) are quite controversial, see Walton,
supra note 111, but this definition suits the question we are asking: whether a court will necessa-
rily deny fair use whenever it faces a contested use for which a market exists.
113 I am indebted to Brett Frischmann here.
I say that foregone license fees are “part of” the value that the defendant generates because
I assume that the defendant and the public will be able to keep some of the value even after the
defendant pays a license fee.  But this assumption is fact dependent.
114 Sometimes allocating the value to the plaintiff better serves social goals, but sometimes
allocating the value to the defendant or splitting the value between the plaintiff and defendant
does so.  Copyright remedies allow for the latter possibility. See 17 U.S.C. § 504(b) (2006) (al-
lowing the copyright owner to recover the infringer’s profits that are attributable to the copy-
righted work, and not some other factors).
115 By defendant’s “foregone” incentives, I mean the incentives that a plaintiff’s contested
2011] FAIR USE MARKETS 1835
Assume that X is a use (such as a reproduction or public distribu-
tion) that appears to fall within the facial grant of the copyright
owner’s rights.116  One can imagine a kind of analysis which asks, is the
world better off where use X is found fair, or where use X is found
infringing?  Fair use analysis sometimes approaches that kind of gen-
eral inquiry.117  For example, the Second Circuit has said more than
once that “[t]he ultimate test of fair use . . . is whether the copyright
law’s goal of promoting the Progress of Science and useful Arts would
be better served by allowing the use than by preventing it.”118
What would we take into account if our goal were promoting
“Progress?”  We would probably take into account the intrinsic satis-
factions of creativity; we might take into account semiotic democracy;
we would take into account a host of considerations relevant to “Pro-
gress” as the concept could best be defined.  No matter how “Pro-
gress” is defined, however, we would almost certainly include the
effect on the plaintiff’s incentives to create,119 sometimes called the
copyright enforcement would block.  Such blockage can arise in several ways.  For example, a
defendant may be unwilling or unable to pay for a socially desirable license if she is unable to
capture the benefits that her use will generate, or a defendant might be willing to pay but the
payment might disrupt a pattern of creative endeavor. See infra Part II.B.
116 17 U.S.C. § 106(1), (3) (reproduction and distribution, respectively).
117 See Beebe, supra note 55, at 620–21 (describing the nature of the balancing test that
courts actually engage in).  Note that I treat this mathematical example as a part of the ultimate
balance in which courts need to engage, rather than as a narrow factor-four inquiry.
118 Bill Graham Archives v. Dorling Kindersley Ltd., 448 F.3d 605, 608 (2d Cir. 2006) (in-
ternal quotation marks omitted).  Commentators (including myself) have suggested even more
wide-ranging tests for fair use.
The court’s reference to “Progress” comes from the constitutional clause granting Congress
power to enact patents and copyrights “[t]o promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts.”
U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 8.
There is much debate on the meaning of “Progress” and the nature of copyright’s goals, but
investigating those issues would take us too far beyond this Article’s confines.  It is my hope that
even if “Progress” is left undefined—an evocative “black box”—one can make a preliminary
assessment of whether “fair use markets” might prove a valuable category to add to fair use
jurisprudence.
119 Doctrinally, many courts performing a factor-four analysis claim to look at a narrower
issue, namely, harm to the plaintiff rather than the effect on the public interest that such individ-
ual harm might cause.  The analysis illustrated here is public oriented.  Professor Beebe argues
that courts do not actually divide the fourth-factor inquiry from the overall fair-use inquiry.
Beebe, supra note 55, at 620–21.
Ironically, the case that brought the “fair use market” concept closest to maturity, namely
Dorling Kindersley, adopted a focus on the plaintiff’s private interest when it came to the fourth
factor.  “This [fourth factor] analysis requires a balancing of ‘the benefit the public will derive if
the use is permitted and the personal gain the copyright owner will receive if the use is denied.’”
Dorling Kindersley, 448 F 3d at 613 (quoting MCA, Inc. v. Wilson, 677 F.2d 180, 183 (2d Cir.
1981)).  When it came to the overall question of fair use, however, Dorling Kindersley utilized a
public-oriented test. Id. at 608.  For an explanation of why I view the inquiry into public rather
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“supply-side question,”120 and foregone license fees are part of that
inquiry.  We should also include the effect on the defendant’s incen-
tives to use and create, sometimes called the “demand-side ques-
tion.”121  Therefore, we would take into account the additional
creative contributions users of copyrighted works could make if freed
of the obligation to obtain permissions.
In short, the impact on creativity that might arise from giving
copyright owners fees from the contested use could be examined,
along with a host of other considerations, in deciding whether to place
the defendant’s use within the prima facie entitlement of the copyright
holder.122
How would that portion of the analysis be conducted?  Assume
the court sought to perform a public-oriented consequentialist analy-
sis that weighs social costs and benefits.  (I am not urging a triumph
for consequentialism in this Article; my goal is a modest one of outlin-
ing how a particular kind of consequentialist argument might go.123)
For the sake of exposition let us say that we are before a court that
wanted to do a consequentialist analysis of this kind, either as part of
or as the sum of its fair use analysis.
Assume the court has before it something like this simplified ex-
ample: The cost of enforcing copyright against the photocopying of
course pack teaching materials might include a loss of “Progress,” par-
ticularly if the higher prices for the best material made professors as-
sign fewer and less useful works to their students.  Assume that the
copyrighted material’s contribution to the community and to the indi-
than private interest as more appropriate, see Gordon, Fair Use as Market Failure, supra note 14,
at 1607–18.
120 Frischmann & Lemley, supra note 44, at 271 & n.51.
121 Id.; see also id. at 280 (discussing the “demand manifestation problem”).  Defendants
produce works that can be analyzed from a supply-side perspective as well, of course.
122 In the midst of almost unanimous criticism of Texaco’s circularity in the law reviews,
one sees a few papers that hint at the same point I am making. See, e.g., Michael G. Frey,
Casenote, Unfairly Applying the Fair Use Doctrine: Princeton University Press v. Michigan Doc-
ument Services, 99 F.3d 1381 (6th Cir. 1996), 66 U. CIN. L. REV. 959 (1998); James V. Mahon,
Comment, A Commentary on Proposals for Copyright Protection on the National Information
Infrastructure: An Analysis of Proposed Copyright Changes and Their Impact on Copyright’s
Public Benefits, 22 RUTGERS COMPUTER & TECH. L.J. 233 (1996); see also Andrea Ottolia &
Dan Wielsch, Mapping the Information Environment: Legal Aspects of Modularization and Digi-
talization, 6 YALE J.L. & TECH. 174, 267 (2003–2004) (“The circularity of the market failure
model arises not when it is used as a descriptive model for calculating the role of given values,
but when it is suggested as a tool capable of focusing and choosing among those values.” (foot-
note omitted)).
123 The analysis is all-things-considered, rather than an inquiry just into the fourth fair use
factor.
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vidual “Progress” of the teacher, students, and those they affect, if the
use was deemed fair and copyright was not enforced, is 1000.  (I am
using an arbitrary metric; whether the affected values are actually
commensurable is an open question.)  Nine percent of that 1000 value
resides in a parody that a student makes and publishes on YouTube,
based on one of the expensively priced works that would be omitted if
licenses were required.  The student would not be able to reap profits
from the parody, so those profits would have no effect on his willing-
ness and ability to pay for the course pack.
Finally, assume that the value to “Progress” of reading the less-
expensive alternative materials that a license-fee-paying professor
would assign is 700 (and that no parody would be made).  Enforce-
ment against the makers of course packs in this case would inflict
short-term “Progress” costs of 300.  These are foregone incentive ef-
fects that could be achieved only by allowing a defendant’s uncom-
pensated use to go forward.
So far it looks like fair use should be granted.  But what about the
extent to which enforcement would benefit “Progress”?  Are there
long-term positive supply-side incentive effects from enforcement?
Let us examine two possible states of the world.
At one pole of factual possibility, it might turn out that the more
desirable materials could only be produced with the promise of col-
lecting fees from course packs.  If so, then fair use would not yield the
value of 300 (because the superior materials would not exist to be
used).  And if any other users would have valued the now-absent ma-
terial above its alternatives, the benefits of finding infringement would
outweigh the cost of granting fair use, unless of course additional cri-
teria were relevant124 (as they should be; the example examines only a
subset of relevant factors).
By contrast, at the opposite pole of factual possibility, it might
turn out that the copyrighted materials at issue would be produced
even without the copyright owner anticipating the licensing fees from
course-packs.  Then “Progress” would be furthered (by the amount of
300) by not enforcing the copyright.125  In such a case fair use would
be appropriate, even though the foregone license fees were included
as part of the calculus.  Counting the fees as relevant did not make fair
use necessarily unavailable.
124 Additional criteria might involve, for example, consideration of rights.
125 Remember that enforcing copyright against photocopiers increases price and thus
makes the value of the materials to users lower than it would be if an alternate subsidy for the
materials’ production were available.
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The example may be abstract and simple, but it illustrates that
counting license fees as part of a fair use calculus does not leave us
condemned to a particular result.  Instead one can ask “what would
happen if we enforced the copyright” and “what would happen if we
did not?”  Depending on the factual state of the world, it may be
worthwhile to force people in the defendant’s position to bear the
fees, or it may not.  The above example employs the presence of po-
tentially available license fees not as a premise that justifies the impo-
sition of liability, but rather as an independent variable within the
factual calculus.  This avoids full circularity because a premise of
“count license fees” does not inevitably lead to the conclusion of “no
fair use.”  As the Texaco court recognized,126 fatal circularity can be
avoided by treating physically foregone license fees as a part of the
analysis rather than conclusive on fair use.127
G. Professor Loren’s Analysis and Beyond
We began with a respected professor’s accusation of circularity.
This Article offers a refinement of her intriguing, careful analysis and
extends it in a new direction.
As you will recall, Professor Loren argues that “[t]he argument
that ‘lost’ permission fees are proof of fourth factor harm has as its
premise the legal conclusion at issue: that the use at issue is not a fair
use and, therefore, the owner is allowed to charge permission fees for
such use.”128  This observation arguably conflates the factual investiga-
tion with the legal conclusion.  As I hope the numerical illustration
has shown,129 there is no need to decide ahead of time whether an
entitlement exists prior to investigating what the effects of such an en-
titlement would be.  The lack of fair use is thus not a “premise” of the
factual investigation; the Texaco argument, as I interpret it at least,
does not, as Professor Loren suggests, “assume at the start the merit
of the plaintiff’s position,”130 nor does it lead conclusively to a finding
126 Am. Geophysical Union v. Texaco Inc., 60 F.3d 913, 929–30 (2d Cir. 1995).
127 The numerical example illustrates a possibility for understanding the Texaco majority’s
approach.  However, note that in focusing on incentive effect, rather than mere private loss, the
numerical example more closely approaches a balancing of all four factors rather than an analy-
sis of just factor four. See supra note 119.
On the distinction between rights analysis and consequentialist analysis in fair use, see, for
example, Gideon Parchomovsky, Fair Use, Efficiency and Corrective Justice, 3 LEGAL THEORY
347 (1997).  The role that rights should play in the fair use analysis is outside the scope of this
Article.
128 Loren, supra note 15, at 38.
129 See supra Part I.F.
130 Loren, supra note 15, at 39 (quoting Williams & Wilkins Co. v. United States, 487 F.2d
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of no fair use.  Yet there is something substantial to Professor Loren’s
charge of circularity when she uses it not as a logical claim, but rather
to comment on the practical tendency of courts.  The Article returns
to this issue below, especially in Part II.B.
Professor Loren also sees the Texaco and MDS opinions as tak-
ing the position that courts should “restrict[ ] fair use to only those
situations where an efficient mechanism for obtaining permission does
not yet exist.”131  Using more technical language to make the same
point, she argues that the Texaco court improperly “narrowed the
market failure theory to include only one type of market failure,”
namely, transaction-cost barriers barring any market at all from aris-
ing in the contested use, and then the court “applied the theory in
reverse, finding no fair use because [that] type of market failure was
not present.”132  If the courts indeed engaged in that procedure, she
and I would agree it was error.133
Moreover, Professor Loren relies not only on the accusation of
circularity, but also on how courts interpret fair use doctrine.134  Her
focus on the latter ground is an important contribution.  As Professor
Loren says, courts do tend to overemphasize the monetary and the
concrete, and often are reluctant to go beyond the visible interests of
the parties before them.135
And in MDS, the Sixth Circuit did seem unduly insensitive to the
external benefits involved, namely, the benefits not reflected in the
students and professors’ current pocketbooks and thus not reflected in
their ability to pay fees.136
1345, 1357 n.19 (Ct. Cl. 1973), aff’d by an equally divided Court, 420 U.S. 376 (1975) (per
curiam)).
131 Id. at 38.  At some points Professor Loren stops short of this characterization.  Thus, she
recognizes that there are several steps between an ultimate finding of infringement (no fair use)
and an initial step of letting foregone license fees help plaintiff prevail on the fourth factor fair
use inquiry. See id. at 38–44.  Further, she usually does not insist that the permission systems
were conclusive on the final issue of infringement in MDS and Texaco, noting instead that the
permission systems “heavily influenced the outcome” of those cases. Id. at 32–33.  Nevertheless,
she also reaches the ultimate conclusion that the MDS and Texaco courts “f[ound] no fair use
because one type of market failure was not present.” Id. at 33.  As it is the latter interpretation
of Texaco that best illustrates the difference in our conceptions of circularity, it is useful to focus
on it.
132 Id.
133 See, e.g., Gordon, Excuse and Justification, supra note 14 (arguing that only in some
cases should the absence of market barriers lead to findings of infringement).
134 See Loren, supra note 15, at 50–51.
135 Id.
136 See MDS, 99 F.3d 1381, 1386 (6th Cir. 1996) (focusing on the commercial use of the
course-pack creator rather than the noncommercial use by students and professors).
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By contrast, it is not as clear that external benefits were improp-
erly undervalued in Texaco.  Admittedly, all research probably gener-
ates positive externalities.  Nevertheless it is arguable that the
commercial nature of the defendant company (the copier’s employer)
made it more likely that many of the benefits of the copier’s scientific
research would be internal, rather than external, to the entity that
would have to pay any licensing fees that the copyright holder might
charge.137  If so, there would be proportionately fewer positive exter-
nalities to take into account than in MDS, and less danger in disre-
garding them.  The court’s discussion of “commercial use” can be
interpreted as taking this position.138  (Of course the court used the
usual statutory factors instead of the language of “externalities.”  The
familiar four-factor test, if well applied, offers expression for many or
most of the important consequentialist factors.)139  Both on its face
and substantively, Texaco thus does not rule out an analysis where the
negative effects of foregone fees could be outweighed (as by, for ex-
ample, defendant’s external benefits).140
Yet the dangers that Professor Loren points out remain present
and quite evident in MDS and perhaps in other cases.141  If the courts
refuse to weigh social benefits of the defendant’s potentially fair use
when the market is unable to do so, we are left with no one making
the relevant decision as to what course—use or nonuse, payment or
no payment—best serves copyright’s goals.  If current copyright law
137 See Am. Geophysical Union v. Texaco Inc., 60 F.3d 913, 915 (2d Cir. 1994) (describing
Texaco’s corporate research efforts).  Some positive externalities are always unable to be cap-
tured.  Just as a growing literature suggests it is unwise for copyright owners to capture all posi-
tive externalities, see, e.g., Mark A. Lemley, Property, Intellectual Property, and Free Riding, 83
TEX. L. REV. 1031 (2005), it is also unwise to structure the law to enable copyright users to
capture all positive externalities.
138 MDS, 99 F.3d at 1386.
139 See Gordon, Fair Use as Market Failure, supra note 14.
140 “Notwithstanding harmful effect, the use may be a fair use.”  On Davis v. GAP, Inc.,
246 F.3d 152, 176 (2d Cir. 2001) (dicta).  Note that in my numerical example above, fair use
could be found even without reference to the defendant’s positive externalities.
141 But see Pamela Samuelson, supra note 71.  Professor Samuelson writes that, “After
Campbell, courts have generally avoided this circularity problem, especially in transformative
and productive use cases.” Id. at 2620.  In support of this observation, she cites, inter alia,
Dorling Kindersley, id. at 2620 n.583, a case which in my view has been underutilized.  Moreover,
Texaco and MDS—both decided after Campbell—remain valid law with a strong impact on the
practices of copying and continued influence on judicial analysis. See, e.g., Murphy v. Millen-
nium Radio Grp. LLC, No. 10-2163, 2011 WL 2315128 (3d Cir. June 14, 2011) (citing Texaco and
MDS).  She also argues that recent cases have been sensitive to factors that mitigate the circular-
ity problem.  Samuelson, supra note 71, at 2620.  Nevertheless, the issue of what counts as plain-
tiff’s market has continued importance both conceptually and doctrinally, and is a matter of
continued debate.  See, for example, Bohannan & Hovenkamp, supra note 71, at 973–74.
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rests on an uneasy basis, as Justice Breyer’s article142 suggests, and if
copyright is too strong on the “writer” side as a host of commentators
argue,143 it would be dangerous to let a lack of substantive decision-
making result in a verdict of infringement.  One way to stop such prac-
tices might be for courts to follow the lead of Dorling Kindersley144
and dictate by doctrine that some criteria warrant treating foregone
license fees differently.
II. WHAT CRITERIA SHOULD ESTABLISH A “FAIR USE MARKET”?
The Second Circuit in Dorling Kindersley implicitly held two
things regarding “fair use markets.”  First, the court held that in a fair
use market, the possibility of fair use was not foreclosed by the possi-
bility that the defendant might have been able to license the contested
use.145  Second, it held that in a fair use market, which it defined as a
market for “transformative” uses, foregone license fees would not
count against the defendant in the factor-four analysis.146  The court
wrote that “[s]ince [defendant’s] use of [plaintiff’s] images falls within
a transformative market, [plaintiff] does not suffer market harm due
to the loss of license fees.”147
In the following Section, I suggest that different criteria are ap-
propriate for the two holdings.  An immensely large category of fac-
tors make it appropriate for markets not to foreclose fair use; a more
142 Breyer, supra note 1.  Justice Breyer’s topic was the advisability of adopting what be-
came the 1976 Copyright Act, with its various expansions of copyright scope and duration.  That
expansion has occurred, with more added since 1976.  Copyright law today gives a duration not
of fifty-six years (as under the 1909 Act) but of life of the author plus seventy years.  New subject
matters, such as architectural works, have been added, as has a limited digital performance right
for sound recordings, and a paracopyright control over access to works.  For a description of
some of copyright’s expansions, see, for example, Litman, supra note 42.
143 See, e.g., Lawrence Lessig, The Creative Commons, 65 MONT. L. REV. 1, 4 (2004).
144 See infra Part II.
145 The court wrote that “a publisher’s willingness to pay license fees for reproduction of
images does not establish that the publisher may not, in the alternative, make fair use of those
images.”  Bill Graham Archives v. Dorling Kindersley Ltd., 448 F.3d 605, 615 (2d Cir. 2006). At
least one commentator has interpreted this language as a statement “that the mere existence of a
licensing market does not mean that a secondary user cannot use the work fairly.”  Jeannine M.
Marques, Note, Fair Use in the 21st Century: Bill Graham and Blanch v. Koons, 22 BERKELEY
TECH. L.J. 331, 344 (2007).
146 Dorling Kindersley, 448 F.3d at 615.
147 Id.  Note that the Dorling Kindersley court did not reach the question of how to treat a
work that has both transformative and substitutionary aspects.  In Campbell, the Supreme Court
separated out the harm done by the parodic nature of defendant’s song as not cognizable, Camp-
bell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 591–92 (1994), but the Court remanded to take
cognizance of any substitutionary harm the same song might have done to the potential market
for nonparody rap derivatives. Id. at 593–94.
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limited number of factors—of which I provide a tentative and sugges-
tive partial list—are appropriate for triggering a court’s willingness to
remove foregone license fees from the fair use calculus.
A. Markets That Can Coexist with Fair Use
Let us refine the Dorling Kindersley court’s definition of “fair use
market” in regard to its first function: identifying markets that can
coexist with fair use.  The court apparently defined “fair use market”
in terms of one criterion: whether the use for which a fee might be
charged was “transformative.”148  That choice is problematic.  In addi-
tion to the difficulties with that criterion discussed earlier,149 and de-
spite the prevalence of courts willing to count a shift in the
defendant’s purpose as a transformation,150 the English word “trans-
formative” inevitably connotes a physical change.  Courts that de-
mand physical alterations would not treat exact copies for new
purposes as “transformative”; such courts could come close to repeat-
ing the mistake that the Ninth Circuit once made in attempting to
restrict fair use to productive authorial uses.151
I would instead define “fair use market” as a market in which we
cannot rely on the decisions of copyright holders to take into account
all the relevant values and interests,152 or as a setting where available
nonmarket interactions and institutions are likely to do a better job in
advancing “Progress.”153  Whether transformative or nontransforma-
tive use is at issue, markets that meet either of these tests should not
foreclose the possibility of fair use.
When circumstances give us no reason to trust that the market
that the Copyright Act enabled will serve social goals, or if there is
affirmative reason to trust nonmarket modes of circulation and pro-
ductivity to do a better job, then those factors should help persuade
toward fair use.  What criteria could lead a court to find market fail-
ures or nonmarket successes?  What circumstances would make a
148 See supra Part I.D.
149 See supra Part I.D and note 98.
150 See Reese, supra note 98.
151 Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Sony Corp. of Am., 659 F.2d 963, 970 (9th Cir. 1981),
rev’d, 464 U.S. 417 (1984).  My first article on fair use was targeted at this restrictive aspect of the
Ninth Circuit’s holding. See Gordon, Fair Use as Market Failure, supra note 14.
152 See Gordon, Excuse and Justification, supra note 14.
153 A preliminary inquiry into nonmarket modes appears below in Part II.B–G (discussing
when to disregard license fees).
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court distrust the capacity of market actors to take account of social
interests, or to trust the capacity of nonmarket actors to do so?154
Legal scholarship already suggests a wide range of factors that
markets might be unable to take into account.  These include market
flaws in general,155 concerns with the distribution of expressive oppor-
tunities,156 works whose creation might be impossible because too
many conflicting claims overlap,157 copyrighted works whose creation
is motivated by nonmonetary concerns,158 uses that occur later in a
work’s life159 or which are so unforeseeable160 that payment for them
would not contribute meaningfully to incentives to create a work, uses
that are not monetarily motivated,161 uses that help to give voice to
marginalized groups162 or otherwise further democracy,163 uses that fa-
154 See Gordon, Fair Use as Market Failure, supra note 14, at 1612–13.
155 See id. at 1614–15; see also Gordon, Excuse and Justification, supra note 14, at 152.
156 Van Houweling, supra note 43; see also Tushnet, supra note 9, at 538–39 (“Creativity,
including remix creativity, is part of a good life . . . .  [W]e should aim for policies that maximize
participation.”).
157 See, e.g., Michael A. Heller & Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Can Patents Deter Innovation?
The Anticommons in Biomedical Research, 280 SCIENCE 698 (1998); cf. Tim Wu, Jay-Z Versus the
Sample Troll: The Shady One-Man Corporation That’s Destroying Hip-Hop, SLATE (Nov. 16,
2006), http://www.slate.com/id/2153961/ (“Thousands or even hundreds of samples . . . mean
thousands of copyright clearances and licenses.  Today, Public Enemy’s breakout album, It Takes
a Nation of Millions to Hold Us Back, would cost millions to produce or, more likely, would
never have been made at all.”).  Although these sources were discussing issues distinct from fair
use, their observations could be applicable to fair use as well.
158 See Lydia Pallas Loren, The Pope’s Copyright?  Aligning Incentives with Reality by Us-
ing Creative Motivation to Shape Copyright Protection, 69 LA. L. REV. 1, 3 (2008).
159 Justin Hughes, Fair Use Across Time, 50 UCLA L. REV. 775 (2003); Joseph P. Liu,
Copyright and Time: A Proposal, 101 MICH. L. REV. 409 (2002).  When the question is how
much to value a future use, the market can indeed discount the value with reference to time.
But when the future comes and a use of an old work occurs, the attendant right to exclude is
usually given as much strength as that held by a newly minted copyright.  One exception applies
to some library uses.  17 U.S.C. § 108(h)(1) (2006) (allowing certain uses “during the last 20
years of any term of copyright”).
160 Bohannan, supra note 71, at 981–85; see also Shyamkrishna Balganesh, Foreseeability
and Copyright Incentives, 122 HARV. L. REV. 1569, 1605 (2009) (arguing that as part of making
out a prima facie case of copyright infringement, a plaintiff should be required to prove that the
defendant’s use was foreseeable at the time of creation).
161 Tushnet, supra note 9, at 543 (“[W]hen copyright’s incentive story breaks down and
people create works that they do not intend to circulate in the money economy, then claims that
such works make fair uses of existing works should be assessed differently, because fair use’s
economic model fails.”).
162 See Anupam Chander & Madhavi Sunder, Everyone’s a Superhero: A Cultural Theory
of “Mary Sue” Fan Fiction as Fair Use, 95 CAL. L. REV. 597 (2007); see also Rebecca Tushnet,
Scary Monsters: Hybrids, Mashups, and Other Illegitimate Children (unpublished manuscript)
(on file with the George Washington Law Review).
163 Neil Weinstock Netanel, Copyright and a Democratic Civil Society, 106 YALE L.J. 283
(1996) [hereinafter Netanel, Copyright and a Democratic Civil Society].  It may be that such
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cilitate social benefits that are not reflected in the potential licensee’s
ability to pay,164 and uses that employ copyrighted works as factual
evidence.165
Though markets fail, will nonmarkets succeed?  The question is
immensely difficult.  Nevertheless, as the next Section indicates, ex-
isting literature already suggests some ways in which nonmarket
modes can do what markets cannot.166
B. Factors That Could Lead a Court to Drop Foregone License
Fees from the Fair Use Calculus
The numerical example167 above suggests that it is sometimes use-
ful to take into account the impact of foregone license fees.  Why
would the Dorling Kindersley decision rule out their consideration for
transformative works?  Part of the reason might be that “transforma-
tive” works are associated with creating benefits for society,168 many
of which are hard to measure.169  Striking out any consideration of
potential license fees might compensate for the difficulty of taking
into account the positive effects that defendants can generate with
their transformative uses of the copyrighted work.  That is, perhaps
the Second Circuit perceived the difficulty of weighing a prodefendant
concerns are incommensurable, or should be immune from balancing considerations on the
ground that they constitute rights.  On First Amendment rights, see, for example, C. Edwin
Baker, First Amendment Limits on Copyright, 55 VAND. L. REV. 891 (2002); Neil Weinstock
Netanel, Locating Copyright Within the First Amendment Skein, 54 STAN. L. REV. 1 (2001).  On
the public’s Lockean rights, see, for example, Gordon, supra note 19; Wendy J. Gordon, Render
Copyright unto Caesar: On Taking Incentives Seriously, 71 U. CHI. L. REV. 75 (2004).
164 See discussion supra Part I.F, I.G.
165 Wendy J. Gordon, Reality as Artifact: From Feist to Fair Use, 55 LAW & CONTEMP.
PROBS. 93 (1992) (arguing that factual uses of copyrighted works merit fair use treatment);
Pierre N. Leval, Commentary, Toward a Fair Use Standard, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1105, 1111, 1114
& n.43, 1115–16 (1990).  Neither ideas nor facts can be owned under the Copyright Act, although
the “expression” portion of works of authorship can be owned.  17 U.S.C. § 102 (2006).
166 See, e.g., Michael J. Madison, Brett M. Frischmann & Katherine J. Strandburg, Con-
structing Commons in the Cultural Environment, 95 CORNELL L. REV. 657 (2010); see also Niva
Elkin-Koren, Tailoring Copyright to Social Production, 12 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L. 309, 318
(2011).
167 See supra Part I.F.
168 To quote Judge Pierre Leval:
[T]he secondary use adds value to the original—if the quoted matter is used as raw
material, transformed in the creation of new information, new aesthetics, new in-
sights and understandings—this is the very type of activity that the fair use doctrine
intends to protect for the enrichment of society.
Leval, supra note 165, at 1111.
169 See BRETT M. FRISCHMANN, INFRASTRUCTURE: THE SOCIAL VALUE OF SHARED RE-
SOURCES (forthcoming 2012) (manuscript at ch. 12) (on file with the George Washington Law
Review). See generally Frischmann & Lemley, supra note 44.
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subfactor (here, external benefits that the defendant’s use gives the
public), and reacted by removing from consideration a proplaintiff
subfactor (such as foregone license fees).  The argument is as follows:
if the external social benefits from the defendant’s receiving fair use
treatment are too “diffuse” to be weighed,170 then perhaps foregone
license fees should not be counted either.171
But how would we know whether the two omitted subfactors will
balance out?  Perhaps we can identify criteria that would make it
more likely that the diffuse demand-side benefits of the defendant’s
use will bring more to the world—either in terms of economics or in
terms of human flourishing—than enforcing the copyright would
bring.
Or perhaps, in some cases, assessing economic incentives will be
beside the point.  There may be circumstances in which license fees
would not be relevant to the values society seeks to pursue, or in
which the fees would not give appropriate incentive messages.
This Article briefly explores these possibilities and seeks to iden-
tify some of the criteria courts could use for determining when it is
appropriate to disregard foregone license fees.  The following Section
draws lightly on the literature on rights, on commonses, and on discus-
sions of commodification.172  The last-mentioned category is perhaps
most in need of explanation.
Much of the scholarship on commodification focuses on whether
the law should forbid or allow markets in particular “things” that
might be bought or sold, such as babies,173 blood,174 votes,175 and
170 See Frischmann & Lemley, supra note 44, at 279–82; Loren, supra note 15, at 50–51.
Whether the spillovers that defendants receive and the further benefits they generate are too
diffuse for courts to consider is a debatable question. See, e.g., id. at 49–56; Pasquale, supra note
72, at 110–35.
171 Professor Loren urges courts to refuse to weigh foregone license fees, in part because
they are likely to be given undue weight. See, e.g., Loren, supra note 15, at 32–34, 38–48, 57.  She
also urges a more complete weighing of external benefits generated by a defendant’s use. See id.
at 54–56.  However, she does not suggest that both solutions should be adopted at the same time
(counting external benefits, and refusing to count foregone fees). See id. at 56 & n.216.
172 The commodification literature has been utilized by copyright scholars before. See, e.g.,
THE COMMODIFICATION OF INFORMATION (Niva Elkin-Koren & Neil Weinstock Netanel, eds.,
2002).  An early version of the article, Gordon, Excuse and Justification, supra note 14, appeared
in that volume.
173 See, e.g., Patricia J. Williams, Spare Parts, Family Values, Old Children, Cheap, 28 NEW
ENG. L. REV. 913, 914–21 (1994) (examining the role of money in adoption).
174 Margaret Jane Radin, Market-Inalienability, 100 HARV. L. REV. 1849, 1850 (1987) (cit-
ing RICHARD M. TITMUSS, THE GIFT RELATIONSHIP: FROM HUMAN BLOOD TO SOCIAL POLICY
(1971)).
175 Prohibition on the sale of votes has obvious implications for equality. See infra note
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human organs.176  Although copyright law is concerned with the re-
lated issue of where markets should or should not be encouraged, cop-
yright and commodification do not map directly onto one another.
Copyright law has some provisions that restrain alienation,177 and
some of its liberties may reflect inalienable rights of the public,178 but
copyright is not generally about forbidding markets (except for mar-
kets in infringing goods).179  Rather, copyright generally permits mar-
kets to arise whether or not the items sold are copyrightable.
Copyright preemption sometimes renders contracts unenforceable,180
but not criminal.181
Another difference might seem to be that, although copyright
places some “things” into permanent categories, the whole point of
fair use is that some things ordinarily backed by exclusion rights
should in some contexts receive different treatment.182
205.  It can also be analyzed from other perspectives. See Richard A. Epstein, Why Restrain
Alienation?, 85 COLUM. L. REV. 970, 988 (1989) (using a largely economic perspective).
176 National Organ Transplant Act § 301(a), 42 U.S.C. § 274e(a) (2006) (prohibiting sale of
organs).
177 Most notably, section 106A of the Copyright Act makes an author’s moral right waiv-
able but nontransferable, 17 U.S.C. § 106A(e) (2006), and sections 203 and 304 give authors
outside the work-for-hire context a partly inalienable right to terminate prior grants, id. §§ 203,
304.  The termination right can be alienated or bindingly waived only under special circum-
stances. See id.  As I have previously explained,
it should be noted that for “fair use,” we are addressing only one part of the com-
modification conundrum: whether an owner should have a right to exclude others
from the resource.  Whether an owner should have a power to exclude herself from
the resource—the issue of inalienability—is a separate question.
Gordon, Excuse and Justification, supra note 14, at 168.
178 Thus, inalienability can be relevant to fair use, if the public has an inalienable liberty
with which copyright enforcement would interfere. See Gordon, supra note 19.
179 17 U.S.C. § 501(a).
180 Contracts are matters of state law, and are thus subject to federal preemption, though
preemption of contracts is fairly rare.  For example, data that is not protected by copyright can
nevertheless be lawfully bought and sold by persons who seek the convenience and accuracy of
dealing with known suppliers. See, e.g., ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg, 86 F.3d 1447 (7th Cir. 1996)
(holding that a shrinkwrap “contract” barring the commercial reuse of public-domain data is not
preempted).  Under some circumstances, however, purported contracts might be preempted by
copyright law. See Vault Corp. v. Quaid Software Ltd, 847 F 2d 255, 268–70 (5th Cir. 1988)
(holding that state statute validating contracts that would restrain a liberty granted by federal
copyright was preempted, and corresponding contractual clauses were held unenforceable).
181 The classic treatments of commodification often involve the criminalization of sale (e.g.,
criminalizing the sale of sex or the sale of human organs).
182 What is at issue in fair use is removing from the usual owner his ability to require sale
and purchase in some contexts. See Arjun Appadurai, Commodities and the Politics of Value, in
RETHINKING COMMODIFICATION: CASES AND READINGS IN LAW AND CULTURE 34, 37 (Martha
M. Ertman & Joan C. Williams eds., 2005) (“[T]hings can move in and out of the commodity
state . . . .”); Gideon Parchomovsky & Kevin A. Goldman, Fair Use Harbors, 93 VA. L. REV.
1483 (2007).
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Nevertheless, many of the same sorts of reasoning apply in fair
use as in the classic commodification debates.  For example, most
commodification scholars do not insist that all “things” have the same
categories despite their context; rather, they recognize that “things”
go through many stages concerning commodification and that context
matters greatly.183  If there are particular “transactions,” or uses, for
which use of a market would be unreliable or counterproductive, it
may be desirable for the law to substitute another and nonmonetary
metric in those contexts, perhaps by refusing to enforce the usual mar-
ket mechanisms.  Moreover, although commodification scholars in-
quire mainly into the effects of allowing things to be bought and
sold,184 their insights also help us examine the effects of requiring
things to be bought when their owners are unwilling to share.  And
that is the focus of fair use: whether courts should require a defendant
to obtain a copyright owner’s consent before making use of a copy-
righted work.
What follows are factors potentially useful for finding a “fair use
market,” not only in the limited sense that fair use and a licensing
market can coexist, but in the more demanding sense of Dorling
Kindersley that foregone license fees should be ignored in making the
fair use calculus.
C. What Do We Make of “Transformativeness”?: A New and
Narrower Criterion
Professor Lewis Hyde has persuasively argued that there are
many artistic communities in which giving or sharing serves the group
and the individual far better than does commodification; those who
copy then make, give, or share their own works in response.185  He
suggests that free receipt brings a desire to reciprocate;186 to receive a
183 Arjun Appadurai, Introduction: Commodities and the Politics of Value, in THE SOCIAL
LIFE OF THINGS: COMMODITIES IN CULTURAL PERSPECTIVE 3, 13–15 (Arjun Appadurai ed.,
1986).
184 See generally Radin, supra note 174 (discussing various approaches to commodification
theory).
185 LEWIS HYDE, THE GIFT: IMAGINATION AND THE EROTIC LIFE OF PROPERTY (1983).
186 The instinct of reciprocity is likely to generate creative gifts back to the community, or
paid forward to future generations, rather than gifts directly to the source of the initial inspira-
tion.  But if as an overall result “givers” become “receivers” in equal measure, such payment “in
kind” may make monetary payment unnecessary and even undesirable for incentives.  (Reci-
procity is a familiar argument in law and economics: if benefits and burdens are likely to even
out, then it is a social loss to engage in costly compensation practices.)  The reciprocity notion
also has roots in theories of fairness and corrective justice; Professor Gideon Parchomovsky has
used the notion of reciprocity as part of a corrective justice approach to fair use. See
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creative work is to be motivated to make a new work in response or in
return.187  Payment can cut off this generative, transformative re-
sponse.188  Perhaps when all these characteristics describe a commu-
nity, license fees might decrease rather than increase incentives.  If so,
it would be odd indeed to assume that potential license fees should be
weighed against the defendant.
Related to the possible role of gratitude in the making of art is
the importance to creative persons of intrinsic motivation and the po-
tential vulnerability of that motivation.  Professor Theresa Amabile’s
experiments suggest that promising rewards to children can reduce the
creativity of their art.189  In a related vein, Professors Uri Gneezy and
Aldo Rustichini and others have investigated whether the introduc-
tion of money can discourage cooperative behavior.190  In such areas,
markets can be counterproductive.
Might this concern with identifying intrinsically motivated indi-
viduals and reciprocal, organic communities be a legitimate reason for
Parchomovsky, supra note 127; see also George P. Fletcher, Fairness and Utility in Tort Theory,
85 HARV. L. REV. 537 (1972).
187 HYDE, supra note 185, at 47–52.
188 Thus, in writing about spiritual conversions sold for a fee, Professor Hyde makes a point
he also makes about art, namely, the importance of gratitude:
[A] fee for service tends to cut off the force of gratitude. . . .  Gratitude requires an
unpaid debt, and we will be motivated to proceed only so long as the debt is felt.  If
we stop feeling indebted we quit, and rightly so.  To sell a transformative gift there-
fore falsifies the relationship; it implies that the return gift has been made when in
fact it can’t be made until the transformation is finished.  A prepaid fee suspends
the weight of the gift and de-potentiates it as an agent of change.
Id. at 51–52.  For being reminded of this apt passage, I am indebted to JoAnn Schwartz’s review
of Hyde’s book, The Gift. See JoAnn Schwartz, Book Review: The Gift: Imagination and the
Erotic Life of Property—by Lewis Hyde, SOUTHERN CROSS REVIEW, http://southerncrossreview.
org/4/schwartz.html (last visited August 1, 2011).
This is part of Hyde’s theory of the “‘transformative’ gift, in which gratitude for inspiration,
or for the change that a gift has caused, prompts the impulse to do the work on it and pass the
inspiration on to others . . . .  It is . . . the impulse that he takes to lie behind most artistic creation
worth having.”  Tim Martin, The Gift by Lewis Hyde: Lone Scribblers, Treasure Your Gift, INDE-
PENDENT (London), Nov. 12, 2006, http://www.independent.co.uk/arts-entertainment/books/re-
views/the-gift-by-lewis-hyde-424028.html.
189 THERESA M. AMABILE, CREATIVITY IN CONTEXT: UPDATE TO THE SOCIAL PSYCHOL-
OGY OF CREATIVITY 163 (1996).
190 Uri Gneezy & Aldo Rustichini, A Fine Is A Price, 29 J. LEGAL STUD. 1 (2000), reported
that fining parents for not picking up their children from daycare on time resulted in more pa-
rental lateness rather than less.  Further, they found that the lateness persisted after the fine was
removed.
It is remarkably difficult to determine precisely why such behaviors occur.  The authors
speculate on various reasons for the parents’ change; it may be that the parents’ set of internal
norms did not change, but that the parents’ perception of the situation changed from one invok-
ing norms of mutual consideration to one invoking market norms. Id. at 10–16.
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being concerned with “transformativeness”?  After all, the concerns I
mention here are drawn from “within” transformativeness, because
intrinsically motivated persons and artistic and scientific communities
typically do “transform” prior works into new works.  Transformative-
ness, however, is drastically overinclusive.
For example, many kinds of transformation, such as making mov-
ies from books, are done in commercial markets where reciprocity and
intrinsic motivation might play relatively little role, or in contexts
where gratitude and its cousins have demonstrated their robustness191
in the face of monetary temptations.  And in Dorling Kindersley, the
Second Circuit made clear its view that alteration is unnecessary for a
“fair use market”—a mere change of context or purpose can make a
use “transformative.”192  So interpreted, transformativeness may have
little to do with the concerns of intrinsic motivation and the triggering
of emotional desires to produce new creative work.
But if we were trying to identify criteria for “fair use markets,”
factors might include the existence of an interdependent community, a
place where gift is fecund and markets yield barrenness, and the pres-
ence of intrinsic motivation vulnerable to “crowding out” by the pres-
ence of explicit monetary payment.  We would need to inquire if the
presence of copyright enforcement as a legal possibility would erode
these communities or their intrinsic motivations or if the two could
coexist.193  To the extent that coexistence is unlikely (a question Mar-
garet Jane Radin examines under the rubric of the “domino effect”—
whether money crowds out other modes of social interaction and valu-
ation194), fair use would be increasingly appropriate.  If allowing some-
one in that group to charge another member for use would trigger a
collapse in intrinsic motivation, that might be a good reason for fair
use.  And if someone from outside the group charged a group member
for use, the group member might then have to charge some of his
compatriots in order to obtain the money needed to pay, again threat-
ening the strength of the gift-repayment motive, and threatening in-
trinsic motivation.
There are obvious difficulties in implementing a search for such
hard-to-measure qualities.  I suggest, however, that we open ourselves
191 For the robustness point, I am indebted to Professor Stacey Dogan.
192 Bill Graham Archives v. Dorling Kindersley Ltd., 448 F.3d 605, 609–11 (2d Cir. 2006).
193 The Hyde gift community is hardly the only kind of nonmarket alternative. See gener-
ally Elkin-Koren, supra note 166.
194 MARGARET JANE RADIN, CONTESTED COMMODITIES 95–96 (1996) (arguing that the
“domino effect” is not inevitable but the danger it poses should be evaluated contextually).
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to the possibility.195  Hyde’s community described in The Gift might be
a place where the demand-side benefits of free use would be more
productive than the supply-side license fees would be.  That is, if a
plaintiff’s license fees are likely to be destructive to creative patterns,
and if the extent of the destruction is hard to measure, then arguably
the foregone fees should not be weighed against the defendant in a
fair use calculus.
D. Nonmarkets that Preserve Product Quality Better than Markets
In The Gift Relationship, Professor Richard M. Titmuss argued
that allowing blood to be purchased degraded the blood supply.196
This resulted, he argued, from two phenomena.  First, making blood a
commodity could “crowd out” altruism, decreasing some donors’ will-
ingness to contribute for free.197  Second, people who sold blood may
come from high-risk populations and money gives sellers a reason to
conceal otherwise-undetectable parts of their health history that
would make the blood a health risk to recipients.198  Therefore,
Titmuss argued, there is a real danger that the quality of the blood
supply would decrease when blood is allowed to be sold.199
Judge Richard Posner has often made an analogous argument
about criticism, suggesting that criticism is one such area where insti-
tuting a market would destroy or diminish the product’s value.200
Judge Posner has contended that if critics had to pay for the right to
quote or summarize, audiences would stop believing that criticism was
objective, and all parties—readers, writers, publishers, and critics—
195 Consider the optimism and resolve in this statement: “Choices about property entitle-
ments are unavoidable, and, despite the incommensurability of values, rational choice remains
possible through reasoned deliberation.  That deliberation should include non-deductive, non-
algorithmic reflection.  It should be both principled and contextual, and should draw upon criti-
cal judgment, tradition, experience, and discernment.”  Gregory S. Alexander et al., A Statement
of Progressive Property, 94 CORNELL L. REV. 743, 744 (2009).  Even if one doubts the ultimate
capacities of deliberation, cf. CASS R. SUNSTEIN, INFOTOPIA: HOW MANY MINDS PRODUCE
KNOWLEDGE (2006) (questioning the effectiveness of deliberation, and identifying sources of
deliberative failure and modes of improvement), exploring methods of disinterested inquiry is
the law’s home ground.
196 TITMUSS, supra note 174.
197 Id. at 95, 198.
198 Id. at 114.
199 Whether or not Titmuss was factually correct that the blood supply would degrade over-
all if markets were instituted, his argument alerts us to the possibility that some products might
degrade if markets for their production or sale were instituted.
200 See, e.g., Ty, Inc. v. Publ’ns Int’l Ltd., 292 F.3d 512, 517 (7th Cir. 2002) (Posner, J.).
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would lose out as the perceived quality and reliability of criticism
went down.201
But that does not mean that criticism is sacrosanct, at least under
a functional and consequentialist analysis.  Facts could change.202  In
addition, of course, the First Amendment might categorically demand
that criticism be given fair use treatment.203  Nonetheless, Titmuss’
functional analysis also suggests another or alternative ground for
finding a “fair use market”: that allowing sale will degrade the quality
of the product.204
E. What of the Use of “Normal” or Customary Areas of Free Use
as a Source to Identify “Fair Use Markets”?
In one of the classics of the commodification literature, Michael
Walzer sought the origin of the lines that the law drew between the
things that could be sold (products) and those whose sale the law pro-
hibited (such as votes, babies, bodies, and sports championships).205
He concluded that the source of the boundary set was inevitably con-
tested and movable and that its origin could not be deduced from a
formal set of principles.206  “Boundaries . . . are vulnerable to shifts in
201 Id.
202 Under some states of the world, criticism might not be a good example of a self-degrad-
ing market.  For example, perhaps all book publishers could form a collective rights organization
that sold no-questions-asked licenses to criticize anything in their inventory.  In such a case,
readers might not fear that critics would alter their reviews to obtain cheaper or free licenses.
Of course, blanket licenses might not solve all the difficulties.  For example, some critics
may write for free, and not having the wealth their social benefit would warrant, could not
purchase a blanket license.  Moreover, a governmental subsidy of the licensing might itself cause
First Amendment difficulties.  Gordon, Fair Use as Market Failure, supra note 14, at 1627–33; see
also Loren, supra note 15, at 26, 49–57 (noting the existence of defendants who generate positive
externalities); Van Houweling, supra note 43, at 1560 (noting the First Amendment difficulties
that accompany government distribution of expressive opportunities).
203 The interplay between fair use and the First Amendment remains controversial, but the
connection between them was strengthened by the Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186 (2003), deci-
sion’s reliance on fair use to help the Copyright Term Extension Act, Pub. L. No. 105-298, 112
Stat. 2827 (1998) (codified in scattered sections of 17 U.S.C.), pass constitutional muster. Eldred,
537 U.S. at 219–20.  Exploring the First Amendment issue is necessary for full treatment of fair
use, but is outside this Article’s particular scope.
204 Arguably the Hyde analysis of gift-based communities could also be classified under this
heading. See supra Part II.C.
205 Walzer argues that the search for equality demands that no one criterion, such as
money, should bind all spheres.  Some things must remain not for sale, such as political office or
athletic championships, to maintain equality; so long as no one metric governs all spheres, differ-
ent leaders and different sources of respect and influence can arise in different spheres. See
MICHAEL WALZER, SPHERES OF JUSTICE: A DEFENSE OF PLURALISM AND EQUALITY (1983).
206 Id. at 319.
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social meaning, and we have no choice but to live with the continual
probes and incursions through which these shifts are worked out.”207
As implied earlier, our concern is similar but not identical to
Walzer’s.  He looked at how a society should decide when its law
should prohibit or permit sales.208  We are concerned with an analo-
gous issue: when should the law require or not require use to be pre-
ceded by purchase.  Things that are appropriately privately owned in
one context—so that people should be required to purchase rights to
use or take it from the owner—might be better treated as unowned in
another context.209
So that is our question: when the law ordinarily requires purchase
as a prerequisite for using something—here, requiring a copyist to
purchase the liberty to copy a work of authorship—when should it
instead allow the owned thing to be used by strangers without permis-
sion or payment?  Although our underlying issues are distinct from
those that concerned Walzer, his approach is, at this point, part of my
approach as well: in trying to decide when a market is simply inappro-
priate, we may not be able to deduce the answer from a formal or
determinate set of principles.  We would probably be greatly assisted
by looking to “shifts in social meanings,”210 or one might call it “polit-
ics writ large.”
Custom may provide one of the acceptable reference points for
this search for social meaning.  Such an argument is bolstered because
some behaviors do arise out of feelings of justice, not just of narrow
self-interest.211  So for all the problems in relying on custom, looking
to uses that are customarily free of charge might be an appropriate
starting place in distinguishing which uses belong in a “fair use mar-
ket”212—so long as the problems in using custom are kept in mind.213
207 Id.  It is hard to predict how the boundaries between different spheres will evolve. Id.
208 Id. at 4–9.
209 Thus, when a copyrighted work is copied as evidence in a court or controversy, the
copying is likely to receive fair use treatment.  One of the reasons is that an expressive work,
something that copyright usually treats as a commodity, is acting in defendant’s context like a
fact, something copyright treats as a noncommodity. See generally Gordon, supra note 165.
210 WALZER, supra note 205, at 319.
211 See, e.g., Russell B. Korobkin & Thomas S. Ulen, Law and Behavioral Science: Remov-
ing the Rationality Assumption from Law and Economics, 88 CAL. L. REV. 1051, 1136 (2000)
(“[T]he desire to treat others fairly can cause deviations from self-interested behavior just as the
desire to be treated fairly can do the same.”).
212 For useful warnings on the proper use of custom, see Rothman, supra note 88.  Profes-
sor Rothman argues that “[t]here are three main justifications for incorporating custom into the
law that have been asserted in other areas of the law . . . .  [N]one of them justifies the incorpora-
tion of custom into IP law.” Id. at 1946.  Yet there are other justifications for custom to which
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Customs of licensing can be absent for normatively insufficient rea-
sons,214 just as licensing can be present for normatively insufficient rea-
sons.215  The legal literature already gives some cautionary suggestions
on how to employ evidence from custom,216 and as Walzer indicates
custom is just part of a more complex inquiry.217  If nothing else, a
custom of free use can serve as a flag planted in new territory: here is
a place with a unique ecosystem whose interplay deserves attention.218
F. Rights, Nonmonetizable Interest, and Self-Defense
License fees are more likely to be relevant when the important
questions are economic.  But sometimes our society does not care
about economic value, but rather about matters that cannot be mea-
sured in fungible currency.  One such category is, of course, rights.
Professor Neil Netanel has properly taught that sometimes even sub-
stantial injury to a copyright owner’s incentives must be tolerated; all
values should not be subordinated to the economic.219  If substantial
injury must sometimes be tolerated, then, a fortiori, there are occa-
sions when it is inappropriate to consider the incentive effects of fore-
gone fees.
We also have other interests that cannot be adequately measured
by money.  We may value creativity, criticism, and dialogue for their
own sake, and we may not be willing to let money crowd them out.
When this is the case, the presence of nonmonetizable interests could
well lead a court to refuse to consider the effect of a plaintiff’s fore-
gone license fees.
Human dignity is another such value.  Courts permit persons who
are attacked in print or picture to reprint the copyrighted material as
she gives more respect. See id. at 1971 (“When a custom develops with an aspirational purpose
in mind, it has more value.”).
213 See, e.g., Gibson, supra note 85, at 897–98 (discussing the proper role of custom in IP
law); Rothman, supra note 88, at 1967–82 (suggesting an analytic model for assessing particular
customs’ usefulness).
214 Gordon, Fair Use as Market Failure, supra note 14, at 1621.
215 See supra Part I.A.
216 See supra note 213
217 WALZER, supra note 205, at 4–6.
218 For a wide-ranging exploration of how social patterns and practices can bear on fair use
and on the creativity fostered by nonmarket connections, see generally Michael J. Madison, A
Pattern-Oriented Approach to Fair Use, 45 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1525 (2004).
219 It was Netanel, Copyright and a Democratic Civil Society, supra note 163, at 330–31,
that caused me to reconsider the “substantial injury hurdle” of my original fair use test.  Gordon,
Excuse and Justification, supra note 14, at 188.
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part of efforts to rebut it.220  In such cases, the license fees that the
“victim” could have paid should be legitimately disregarded.221
G. Coincidence or the “Orthogonal” Use
When we want to count license fees, it is because they give a good
message about what kinds of creative works are desired and with what
intensity society desires them.  But sometimes what the defendant has
done gives no relevant “incentive message” to the copyright owner.
Consider the unauthorized copyist who mass-duplicates sheet
music, not to sell to musicians, but to sell as wallpaper.222  It is pure
coincidence that the sheet music looks attractive; the composer in-
tended to create sound, not visual art.  The relationship between the
copyist’s purpose and the message society wants to give to encourage
composers is, in Professor Pam Samuelson’s apt term, “orthogonal.”223
The extreme shift in purpose suggests that giving the composer re-
wards for the wallpaper would not give any relevant incentive
messages.224
In tort law, the doctrines of proximate cause and duty often func-
tion to rule out liability for such merely coincidental effects.225  Fair
use can do the same, and in making the fair use calculus, there is no
reason to include the license fees that the wallpaper-maker could have
made.
220 See, e.g., Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Moral Majority, Inc., 796 F.2d 1148, 1153 (9th Cir.
1986) (permitting Reverend Jerry Falwell to make mass copies of an ad parody that held him up
to ridicule in order to raise money to rebut the personal attack upon him)  Admittedly, just as
the tort privilege of physical self-defense is limited to that violence which is reasonably neces-
sary, the self-defense justification for fair use has limits as well.
221 There is also a rights-based argument for allowing such fair use to go forward regardless
of supply-side incentive effects. See Gordon, supra note 19.
222 This is not as fanciful as it sounds.  Many websites sell sheet music as part of “wall
paper” for websites, and some home decorators apparently have a similar idea. See Jessica Tur-
ner, How to Wallpaper with Sheet Music, HOWTODOTHINGS.COM, http://www.howtodothings.
com/how-to-wallpaper-with-sheet-music (last visited Aug. 11, 2011) (recommending a “do-it-
yourself” method involving the use of existing sheet music rather than copying).
223 See Samuelson, supra note 71, at 2557–59.  “Orthogonal” means “intersecting or lying at
right angles,” and suggests a lack of statistical correlation. Orthogonal Definition, MERRIAM-
WEBSTER, http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/orthogonal?show=0&t=1312674127 (last
visited Aug. 6, 2011).  Professor Samuelson classifies the self-defense category under “orthogo-
nal uses” rather than under “dignity uses,” but it could fit in either place.
224 The goal here is to make “the harm element in fair use” more closely “tied to copy-
right’s purpose of encouraging innovation.”  Bohannan & Hovenkamp, supra note 71, at 974,
225 See Wendy J. Gordon, Copyright and Tort as Mirror Images: On Not Mistaking for the
Right Hand What the Left Hand Is Doing, in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY, INNOVATION AND COM-
PETITION (A. Nicita, G. Ramello & F.M. Scherer eds., forthcoming 2012).
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Shift in purpose has long been a part of fair use doctrine; as men-
tioned previously, it has even become for many courts the primary
basis for finding that a use is “transformative.”226  But the definitions
are slippery and many questions are unresolved.227  The inquiry into
purpose could be sharpened by asking if there is a relationship be-
tween, on the one hand, the reasons the defendant might want a right
to copy, and, on the other hand, the qualities society seeks to en-
courage in the plaintiff’s efforts.228
* * *
The above Section suggests that the category of “fair use mar-
kets” would be more useful if its two functions were separated.  One
function is to identify markets that can coexist with, and not foreclose,
fair use.  The criteria for that function are broad and immensely wide
ranging because there are so many ways in which copyright markets
can fail to serve public ends.  The other function of “fair use markets”
is to identify uses for which foregone license fees should not be
counted into the fair use calculus.  The criteria for that function are
much narrower.  It is hoped that the partial list of criteria that appears
here will help courts distinguish between situations in which foregone
fees should and should not be counted as part of the fair use inquiry.
CONCLUSION
Newly emerging markets for copyrighted works pose difficulties
for social policy.  Before a market for a particular use evolves—at a
226 Professor Reese sees the inquiry into purpose as the dominant meaning of “transforma-
tiveness” from 1994 through 2007. See Reese, supra note 98; see also discussion of Dorling
Kindersley supra text accompanying note 192.
227 Professor Reese helpfully outlines many questions about “purpose” that would need to
be resolved before it could be decided what weight, as a normative matter, should be placed on a
defendant’s purpose, and how inquiries into that purpose should be formulated.  Reese, supra
note 98, at 494–96. See also Marques, supra note 145, at 347–48 (suggesting that the Dorling
Kindersley court went beyond an inquiry into “functional purpose” to a more questionable in-
quiry into “expressive purpose”).
228 Professor Samuelson suggests that orthogonal uses tend to be treated as “fair” only in
the presence of other favorable factors.  Samuelson, supra note 71, at 2557–59.  My argument is
somewhat different: the presence of a thoroughly orthogonal use can by itself mandate dropping
foregone license fees from the factor-four fair use calculus.  There is, of course, more to fair use
than the factor-four inquiry, so the approaches of Professor Samuelson and myself might con-
verge on this point.
Lack of foreseeability has been urged by some to serve as a basis for fair use. See, e.g.,
Christina Bohannan, supra note 71; Bohannan & Hovenkamp, supra note 71.  That proposal is
very much worth exploring, but it is sometimes criticized because of the elastic nature of the
“lack of foreseeability” concept.  As compared to “unforeseeability,” orthogonality is less malle-
able and thus more reliably unrelated to incentives.
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stage when no license fees could be practicably collected—allowing a
defendant to go forward without permission and payment would ad-
vance the defendant’s social goals, and there might be little harm to
weigh against the public interest that the defendant serves.229  But as
new licensing markets begin to appear through institutional develop-
ments, such as the Copyright Clearance Center,230 technological ad-
vance, or otherwise, the question becomes harder.  Should the courts
count against fair use—even as one part of a complex calculus—the
incentive effects of license fees that the defendant and others like him
could practicably have paid, but did not pay?
In prior work, I have emphasized that the absence of a market
between copyright owner and user can play a key role in fair use,231
that the presence of a market need not eliminate fair use,232 and that
knowing if a market is the preferred institution requires inquiry along
a number of factual and normative fronts.233  This Article has taken an
additional step of asking how foregone fees should be treated for pur-
poses of assessing the fourth factor of the fair use inquiry.  When a
market is present, it may be possible for the copyright owner to ac-
quire a portion of the value generated by a defendant’s use—but
should the law empower the owner to do so?  This Article suggests
that it would be overbroad to strike all foregone fees from being con-
sidered in the fair use calculus, but that in a subset of cases it could
indeed be improper to weigh foregone fees against a defendant.
Under today’s state of precedent, the risk remains alive that nascent
markets and foregone fees will tend to improperly reduce the scope of
the fair use doctrine.  If that happens, it may reduce the liberty, qual-
ity of life, and productivity of Macaulay’s “readers.”  That is, undue
restriction of fair use could threaten all of us except at the moment we
are asserting one of our copyrights.  As one possible response to that
risk, this Article suggests we revive and explore giving new meanings
to the Second Circuit’s category of “fair use markets.”
229 See Gordon, Fair Use as Market Failure, supra note 14.
230 See generally About Us, COPYRIGHT CLEARANCE CTR., http://www.copyright.com/con-
tent/cc3/en/toolbar/aboutUs.html (last visited July 18, 2011).
231 Gordon, Fair Use as Market Failure, supra note 14.
232 See Gordon, Excuse and Justification, supra note 14; Gordon, supra note 56.
233 Gordon, Fair Use as Market Failure, supra note 14.
